

Hindi and the Politics of Status

Official/National: Anatomy of a Double Sector Discourse

Abhay Kumar Dubey

Editor, Indian Languages Programme, CSDS

Fourteen year old Swati Ramanan has a new literary crush: Munshi Premchand. ‘The first story by Premchand that I read and loved was *Idgah*. That must have been six month ago,’ she says in English, before self-consciously switching to somewhat accented Hindi. ‘*Main ab unki ek aur kahani padh rahi hun, Bade Bhaisahab,*’ she says shyly. Swati lives on the seventh floor of a tall apartment complex in Kodamakkam, Chennai. ... In her room is green felt board with a few Hindi *dohas* pinned on it alongside cartoon cut-outs. ... She points out to one of her favourite couplets by Kabir: *Deere dheere re mana, dheere sub kuchh hoye; Mali seenche sau ghara, ritu aye phal hoye.*¹

In the year of 1949 and on the 14th of September, two things happened successively in the Constituent Assembly of India. The constitution builders made Hindi, the language of the largest block of country’s populace, official language of the Union.² And immediately after it, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the chairman of the assembly and would be first president of the Republic, welcome the moment, ‘We have done wisest possible thing, and I am glad,

¹ This is the upper part of a long quotation that I have taken from a report by V. Shobha recently published in *The Indian Express*. The report contains useful information about the current state of the work Dakshin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabhas has been doing in Chennai, a traditional hub of anti-Hindi politics. The next part of the quotation is used later in this paper.

² In the part seventeenth of the constitution language provisions runs from article 343 to 351. Article 343 makes Hindi in Devnagari script official language of the Union. Next article empowers President of India to appoint first Official Language Commission after five years of the adoption of the constitution. Subsequently after every ten years these commissions will have to be appointed by President. The commission was to report to president about the progress made by official language. Articles 345 and 346 empower states to pass their own official language acts and to use one or more than one languages for the purpose of their administration. To get the status of official language, it has to be spoken by at least 15 per cent of the state’s population. Under this provision Nagaland and some Union Territories have made English their official language despite the fact that they have their own indigenous linguistic traditions. In Kashmir Urdu is official language, and not the Dogari or Kashmiri. According to these provisions English would remain in use if it was in use before the adoption of the constitution unless it is proscribed by new legislation. Besides, according to article 346, two or more than two states can decide about the linguistic medium in which they will correspondence with each other. Article 347 empowers president of India to allow the recognition of any language as the official one, other than the already recognized, if a substantial part of the state population demands for it. The next article makes English the language of Supreme Court and High Courts, until Parliament legislates otherwise. Article 350(A) protects the right of linguistic minorities to impart primary education in the mother-tongue of one’s community. Article 351 determines the duty of the Union to develop Hindi as its Official language. It broadly demarcates the process by which Hindi can be made to serve the needs of the composite culture of India.

I am happy, and I hope posterity will bless us for this.’ He then went on to predict that Hindi would ‘forge another link that will bind us all together from one end to the other.’ (Austin 2009).

Rajendrababu must have thought that after all those bitter debates³ the constituent assembly is able to accomplish what he and other members of anti-colonial elite were handed over to by Gandhi. Perhaps he took for granted that the hegemony of English, the associate official language of the Union, will wane during the constitutionally stipulated period of fifteen years to allow a language of Indian roots to finally replace it. The seeds of this hope were sown as early as in 1916 when speaking in the second Gujarat Education Conference at Bharuch, Gandhi set the language-agenda by asking ‘What is test of a national language?’, and then made five observations about a possibility of future: ‘For the official class it should be easy to learn; the religious, commercial and political activities throughout India should be possible in that language; it should be the speech of the majority of the inhabitants of India; for the whole of country it should be easy to learn; and in considering the question, weight ought not to be put upon momentary or short-lived considerations.’ He also made sure to name the language that fits his political imagination: ‘There is not another language capable of competing with Hindi in satisfying the five conditions.’ Gandhi delivered his presidential address in Gujarati and used the expression *antarbhasha* alternatively for the word *rashtra-bhasha* and *swabhashas* for regional languages. (Kher 1956: 377).

Since we now know a lot about the colonial politics of language and it’s subsequent history, we can see that combined effect of these happenings proved far more complex. It plotted in the structures of Indian modernity a kind of ambivalence, born not out of the much maligned modern-tradition dichotomy but caused by the dialectic of modern itself and rendered the status of Hindi subject to perpetual process of conflicts and compromises. Besides, it also reinforced the unique designation of India as ‘the

³ In his *Thoughts on Linguistic States* (Delhi, 1995), Ambedkar recalls about the debates in the assembly: ‘No article produced more opposition. No article produced more heat.’ Strangely, he mentioned the article 115, but in the constitution no such article figures in the language provisions.

laboratory of languages'⁴ by making Indian case radically different from the European concept of 'one nation-one language'.

In the sixties, in order to study the language-planning in post-colonial nations, a group of influential linguists made a classification and thereby provided a template for understanding the formulations of the constituent assembly.⁵ They fixed categories or types largely on the basis of the purported self-image of the elite of these countries. The type A elite was the one who suffered from the perceived lack of an integrating great tradition therefore adopted a policy of having a western import, such as English, French or Spanish, as their national language. By implication the 'small' linguistic traditions of these countries were forced to play a reduced role of local communication. The elite of type B, on the contrary, had a self-image of having one all-encompassing great cultural and linguistic tradition. Consequently they felt insulted even by a hint that they can also benefit by such arrangement. The idea of having a western language as the vector of their modernity firmly discounted, these countries assigned the role of national integration to the dominant language of land even if it has to be forced down the throat of linguistic minorities. The elite of type C, in which India was designated, encountered comparably far more complex situation where several great traditions were competing to seek socio-political recognition. Joshua Fishman described the situation of such countries as follows:

Indeed, in nations characterised by type C decisions the nation itself must stand for a supra-nationalistic goal or purpose, since nationalism per se is a rather well developed but traditionally regional (i.e. sub-national) phenomenon. This fact has long been recognised by elites in several nations, whether facing problems of religious, political or economic integration. ... At the regional level, language selection in nations making type C decisions is no more problematic

⁴ Though no country or society in the world can be called unilingual because multilingualism is a universal norm every where, India falls in a special category due to its great linguistic diversity. Only Africa can be compared with it for its linguistic pluralism. India has four language families: Indo-European (Hindi, Assamese, Oriya, Marathi, Konkani, Gujarati, Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Bengali, Nepali, Dogari, Bhili to name a few), Dravidian (Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Kannada), Austro-Asiatic (Santhali, Mundari, Ho, Khasi), and Tibeto-Burman (Tibetan or Bhotia, Newari, Dzongkha). The constitutional provisions have created a four tier pyramidal structure in which Hindi and English are on top as official languages of the Union, then comes the 22 languages of the eighth schedule (Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu, Maithili, Dogri, Santhali). The third tier relates to the languages with widespread currency according to which 47 languages are being used for primary education, 87 used in print media, 71 used in radio, 13 used in films and 13 in state-level administration. Fourth tier is of local vernaculars that are consisting of 114 recognised varieties, 216 mother-tongues with more than 10,000 speakers.

⁵ Mainly the contribution of Joshua Fishman in late sixties, this classification was reaffirmed in the works of fellow linguists Charles A. Ferguson, Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Joan Rubin and Bjorn Jernudd. African countries like Cameroon, Ghana and Gambia were placed in the category A; Philippines, Indonesia, Tanzania, Israel, Thailand, Somalia and Ethiopia were put in the category B; and India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Malaysia were designated for the category C.

than it was in nations characterised by type B decisions since, once again, regional great traditions inevitably have their language counterparts. It is at the broader national level, however, that language selection problems occur in nations characterised by type C decision, since any indigenous candidate for the role of national language would yield an unfair advantage to its native speakers. ... In order to avoid any party an advantage— and in order to avoid constant rivalry for greater national prominence among the various contenders—a foreign language of wider communication is frequently selected de jure or utilised de facto as (co-) official or as working language at the national level (sometimes in conjunction with an indigenous national language which may actually be little employed by those who are ostensibly its guardians). ... However, in opting for type C decisions the regional level of socio-cultural and political-operational integration remains extremely lively and important. As a result, each regionally recognised official language required modernisation for its own regional governmental, educational, technological and modern cultural realisations. ... This is not to say that no language-planning is conducted at the national level in nations characterised by type C decisions for that is not necessarily the case. The national authorities are frequently left with the delicate responsibility of planning for the wider acquisition of both, the sometimes co-official language of wider communication and the indigenous national language, each of which is likely to have opponents in one region or another. ... The model regional citizen of the future is viewed as bilingual at the very best. From a national perspective too bilingualism is frequently considered the natural and desired state of affairs involving the indigenous national as well as the Western (of working) language of wider communication. Once again, the model citizen is viewed as multilingual with each language having its well defined and rather exclusive functions. (Fishman:1969)

While analysing type C decisions, Fishman mainly had Indian case in mind, but even a scholar as perceptive as he could not fathom the long term impact of the sixties, a notorious decade of Indian politics dubbed as the most dangerous mainly due to its linguistic dimensions.⁶ The decade was marked, to begin with, by the conclusion of state reorganisation on linguistic basis and was politically haunted by two language movements in opposition to each other, a violent anti-Hindi movement in the state of Tamilnadu and an aggressive call for *Angrezi Hatao* sweeping accross North India. Negotiating with these disturbing developments in a halting manner, the Indian state ultimately settled to keep English as a rather permanent official language of the Union,

⁶ Salig Harrison, a prominent US think-tank intellectual, declared that the 1967 general elections of India as probably the last one due to the implosion of linguistic identities. Though his book on the issue contained extensive data of Indian language problem, but is now remembered for only its failed prophecy.

though technically it remained second to Hindi. In the realm of education the state tried to deploy the three-language formula⁷ with the hope of achieving a multilingual citizenship.

Forty years have passed since then, and India is still designated as a country of type C in the book of linguists. New states are still being configured but on the logic of development and good governance. Political campaigns of anti-Hindi or anti-English varieties have now become history and the public domain is agog with the arguments about the recommendations given by Knowledge Commission⁸ on the importance of teaching English from the level of class one. The last time anti and pro-English cries were heard was in nineties when four northern chief ministers decided to banish English from the official work of their states, but it was balanced approximately at the same time when the government of Bihar made English compulsory in its school curriculum.⁹ Though still not a part of the eighth schedule of the constitution, English is now considered by several opinion makers as another Indian language despite its colonial roots.¹⁰ The days is not far, it seems, when state governments will compete with each other in opening English medium primary schools, a beginning of which can be spotted in Mamta Benerjee's newly rechristened Paschim Bang. In fact, the onslaught of globalized culture has removed all kinds of cultural hesitations that used to work as barriers in accepting English.

⁷ This formula was devised in 1956 by the Central Advisory Board of Education, and later adopted by the Conference of Chief Ministers in 1961 for the purpose of equalization between the teaching of Hindi and other Indian languages. Unworkable in its initial stages, it was constantly refined for implementation in sixties. D.B. Pattanayak has provided some insights about this process. Basically this formula calls for trilinguism or quadrilinguism in education. In addition to Hindi and English, students are expected to learn a third language beyond his or her mother-tongue. For example, in the Hindi-Urdu-Punjabi belt, if students learn one of the Dravian languages, they can be called truly multilinguals. But intentions apart, North Indians have shown very little inclination to learn any language other than English. Practically it functions in many areas as a two language formula, in some areas four language formula.

⁸ Knowledge Commission was appointed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005 as a think-tank to advise his government on the ways of putting India on the world knowledge map. Its chairman was Sam Pitroda with Ashok Ganguli, Nandan Nalikeri, Deepak Nayar, Jayati Ghosh, Sujata Ramdurai, P. Balram and Amitabh Mattu as members with a few others later incorporated in it. It constantly hogged headlines due to its inner contradictions but its recommendations went mostly unattended by scholars.

⁹ Tej K. Bhatia has provided an insight about it: 'The action of Bihar might appear to be aimed at promoting additive bilingualism; however underlyingly the two campaigns were motivated by a revolt against the forces of dominance and power of either or of the upper caste since promotion of Hindi in Uttar Pradesh was intended to reduce the influence of English (hence of the English-speaking upper class) whereas the promotion of English of all in Bihar was designed to mitigate the influence of a successful English speaking upper caste there'

¹⁰ The attempted entrée of English in the eighth schedule was first thwarted in the constituent assembly, and in 1959 it was again demanded but disfavoured by Nehru.

The flip side of this scenario is also equally significant. While accepting the fact that English is making inroads in the areas hitherto untouched by it, nobody from Kashmir to Kanyakumari will dare to insist on the status of national language for it. Even if people do not know exactly what they mean by it in the context of their own time and space, they will keep designating Hindi as *rashtra-bhasha* with the varying subjectivities attached to it: a loving affirmation of nationalist legacy for some, an indication of unsuccessful constitutional projects for others. If an informal enquiry is conducted among the people whose self-image is that of being intellectuals, Hindi will probably surface as the only Indian language which can stop English in its march to become 'master language' of India. Almost everybody, even the ones with a pronounced pro-English bent, concedes the tremendous spread of Hindi outside of its geographical area with other Indian languages preferring mostly their own settings.

Being an observer of Hindi and its development as an all India link-language,¹¹ an opportunity came my way during a recent outing at Bharat Bhavan, Bhopal to take stock of this paradoxical situation. Overwhelmed by the pessimistic vibes, some Hindi enthusiasts insisted that the participants of the function-cum-seminar must adopt a proposal to protect Hindi from its impending doom at the hands of the English oriented forces of globalisation. One among them rhetorically predicted that this language will die in 2040, and another one went on to the extent of fixing the poverty line of Hindi at the income of Rs. 20,000 per month, i.e. Hindi will remain the linguistic instrument of poor and underdeveloped of this land. When I began to investigate the futures of Hindi, I found to my amazement how vast and varied this discourse has become over the years. My central hypothesis, zeroed in after going through labyrinth of documents and data, is three-fold:

First, scholars have generally traced the contemporary history of Hindi as a single-sector discourse, mostly in the realm of 'official or national', whereas it should be reconfigured as a double-sector discourse. One sector consists of semi-aborted project of making it official language of the Union. The other sector covers the vast social arena in which Hindi's career is constantly blossoming as all-India link. **Second**, the Indian concept of

¹¹ I have attended to this theme at IAS, Shimla during a study weak (2009) on 'Rethinking Hindi modernity' in which I mainly analysed the non-Hindi opinion about the possibilities of Hindi becoming all India link-language.

national language or for that matter official language, can not be understood or analysed in the mirror of European experience, no matter whether one accepts it as a paradigm or become uncomfortable of its alien-ness to South Asia. Unless we configure an Indian paradigm for its own kind of bilingualism or multilingualism, we will remain willing or unwilling partners in those prophecies that talk about either doom and gloom or make us more cynical in our thinking on these matters. **Third**, the builders of the constitution might have thought in their considered wisdom that the establishment of Hindi as official language of the Union will accelerate its approval as a genuine lingua-franca of multicultural India, but the conspiracy of events has now reversed the order. Hindi, with its great spread and acceptance by people and society, is well set to create the circumstances to replace English, if ever, as the de facto linguistic medium of the Union and by its implication push it to the margins among the community of elite.

I

Before the Constitution / 1925-1949

The language question proved one of the greatest tormentors for the constituent assembly of India, though in its initial phase most of its members did not suffer any anxiety on this count. Their complacency was the result of the convenient impression they formed on the basis of the politics of language practiced consistently throughout the anti-colonial movement. Equipped with the popular legacy of freedom struggle, they hoped to realize a two-fold readymade policy without much problem on the floor of assembly: make Hindi the national language and give the regional languages full opportunity to blossom at the level of states. By taking these two steps several members of assembly thought that they will fulfil Gandhi's wish to replace English from the dominant position in national life. But in stead of sailing through, they soon came to realise that the legacy which worked perfectly for the purposes of anti-colonial mobilisation is extremely difficult to implement as the policy for the future. In fact the legacy had an inbuilt double character, a public face that was inspiring and assuring, and another face, not hidden but hardly being enquired into.

Legacy's Public Face: Represented mainly by Gandhi, the public face of the legacy was chiselled with great finesse. Gandhi saw no contradiction between the idea of a national language and simultaneous encouragement to the regional linguistic cultures. In his *Thoughts on National Language*, he railed against the social elite who never thought twice before reserving the status of link-language for English. Convinced that the fate is not working according to Raja Ram Mohan Rai's futuristic vision that one day India would become an English speaking country, he commented sarcastically that the elite is still haunted by the ghost of great men. (Gandhi1956:17). As we have seen in the first part of this paper, Gandhi's definition of the term national language was *antarbhasha* (link-language) and he addressed various languages of India as *swabhashas*. He repeatedly used the terms national language and link-language alternatively. In 1918 he explained his position in a speech that 'unless we give Hindi its national status and the provincial languages their due place in the life of people, all talk of Swaraj is useless.' (Kher, p). Shortly after the independence he sought to clarify the language policy of anti-colonial struggle to reinforce the argument why it should be continued forthwith:

The redistribution of provinces on a linguistic basis was necessary if provincial languages were to grow to their full height. Hindustani was to be the lingua franca, Rashtra Bhasha of India, but it could not take the place of provincial tongues. It could not be medium of instruction in the provinces, much less English. Its function was to make them realise their organic relationship with India. ... We must therefore resolutely discourage all fissiparous tendencies and feel and behave as Indians. Subject to this paramount consideration, a linguistic redistribution of provinces should give an impetus to education and trade. (Kher: 382)

Was Gandhi's conception of Hindi as national link-language based upon some structural logic of Indian society or was it mere piece of his nationalistic conviction? Hindi's status as a linking media was never in doubt in its own huge backyard where various cultural zones thrived historically through their *janpadeeya bhashas*, but whether Hindustani-Hindi would be able to play the role of *antarbhasha* in non-Hindi areas without disturbing their own gradually developing linguistic hegemonies was a much more open question. In his substantial work *Bhasha Aur Samaj*, Ramvilas Sharma provides some kind of an answer:

Over the centuries Hindi has been in making as the language of intra-nationality contact under the specific conditions of this land. Even before the nineteenth century the working of a centralised Mogul empire in North India and the development of the large trade-centres like Agra were among the reasons that facilitated the people's diffusion over various regions. Learning Hindi was an aspect that made practice of trade convenient for even the British merchants. To this day throughout the areas of south, east and west one can find merchants and capitalists whose cultural language is Hindi. A substantial reason of Hindi's expansion relates to the millions of 'Hindustani' workers staying in centres like Calcutta and Bombay. Apart from these metropolises every nationality region has the population of Hindustanis as the members of minority communities. The Vishal Andhra area of Hyderabad and its surroundings have the dense concentration of Hindustanis. Through these processes Hindi easily became intra-nationality contact language. ... Besides, there are other complementary attributes that go with Hindi language, script and literature to help this cause. (Sharma 2011: 124)

Sharma quotes a letter dated August 29, 1806 written by assistant resident of Delhi C.T. Metcalf to J.B. Gilchrist, the founder of Fort William College. After expressing his heartfelt gratitude towards Gilchrist for teaching him Hindustani, Metcalf went on to describe his experience of travelling from Kanyakumari to Kashmire during which he found people with the knowledge of this language everywhere. Hindustani, claimed Metcalf, is a tongue which he could use effectively while interacting with the various speech communities. As a Marxist theoretician Ramvilas Sharma was apparently looking at the dynamics of pre-modern mercantile capitalism to reflect upon the cross-cultural diffusion of Hindi.¹² Recently Vinod Shahi also wrote about the class of city merchants, sellers of various goods, craftsman and artisans that promoted and carried Hindi to distant regions.¹³ In his discourse during the sixties and seventies Ramvilas Sharma also provided detailed evidence of the organic linkages that forged connections of Hindi and its *janpadeeya bhashas* with the cultural consciousness of non-Hindi speakers.

For the leadership of anti-colonial movement the merits for link-language went beyond the cultural or linguistic logic. In stead of harping on the comparative literary

¹² Ramvilas Sharma, arguably the most important Marxist theoretician of his generation and a colossus like figure who wrote around hundred volumes in his prolific life, held the view that the medieval period of the Indian history may be treated as akin to the European renaissance due to the conflation of merchant capital and the creativity of devotional poets across the land.

¹³ I have come across this hand-written piece titled 'Bhasha ki Gyan-Kuntha urf Adhunikta ka Dvaidh aur Hindi' in the seminar on the theme of 'Bhoomandalikaran aur Hindi ki Asmita' organized by Bharat Bhavan, Bhopal on September 24-25, 2011. Had Shahi provided some evidences to bolster his claims, his findings would have strengthened his argument more.

achievements or the ancient pedigree of the language, their practical wisdom looked for the political vantage points. Bengali was far ahead of Hindi in literary accomplishments and Rabindranath Tagore became the Nobel laureate in thirties. On the criterion of ancient literary tradition no language could have beaten Tamil's unbroken uniqueness. But the leadership was initially attracted towards Hindi's demographic dividend (Hindi speakers were twice as much of Bengali and six times the number of Tamil speakers). But beyond this majoritarian argument was another double edged one that must have clinched the issue in Hindi's favour. Firstly, other linguistic cultures did not find themselves at disadvantage vis-à-vis Hindi, whereas the Bengali and Tamil linguistic cultures enjoyed superiority over other linguistic groups in term of employment and influence due to the fact that, compared to its other administrative centres, the Raj conducted its affairs mainly from Calcutta and Madras presidencies. (Kaviraj:2009). Secondly, the newness of Hindi and its far less standardised structure made it more amenable to any possible linguistic engineering of the nationalistic kind. Suryakant Tripathy 'Nirala' made this point in as early as 1923 by suggesting that Hindi, that is going to be the national language, is not the mother-tongue of any region and is still being given shape by writers. The contours of this language, said Nirala, will rightfully be decided by the authors of various linguistic cultures and people of every region to fulfil its destiny of settling India's social, economic, political, scientific, historical and literary issues. An unusual statement indeed from one of the greatest poets of a language in which he delegated to non-speakers the right to coin the new words and put them in the grammarian frame to make them more natural and fluent. (Kanth: 2000). Not speaking in a fit of nationalism or under the influence of sudden benevolence, Nirala was underlining the 'semi-synthetic' character of a language that was certainly not the mother-tongue or a media of domestic communication even in the households of its most ardent supporters. The semi-syntheticness of Hindi was evident from the fact that unlike other languages its development did not flow from the generative capabilities of poetic creations, but for the sake of meeting the modern needs of non-poetic texts. It had back and forth linkages with its cultural zones but never got the indelible imprint of any *janpadeeyata*.¹⁴

¹⁴ This claim has been made variously, but lacks a solid study to back it. Ramvilas Sharma (1976) has especially focused on this issue in the first volume of his seminal work in which he mobilized evidences of the impact of more than one *janpadeeyata* on the making

The People and the Elite: In an assembly having a kind of all India character a few members did try to project alternatives to Hindi but only in vain because the case of Hindi was structured on an unassailable theory. Then, why did this theory fail to work smoothly during the debates of the constituent assembly and thereafter in post-colonial India is a question that still seeks plausible answers. Most scholars recognise only the public face of the linguistic consensus formed during freedom struggle and conclude that it was challenged inside the assembly and finally pushed to the margins in the politics of independent India. Sudipta Kaviraj's attempt of arriving at understanding of this failure stops at gates of the Indian state:

Abstractly, it appears that cultural problems of nationalism can be handled better when the ideological force of nationalism is assisted by the material power of the modern state. Yet, on a historical view, it seems that the Indian national movement, when it had to contend with the enmity and obstructiveness of the colonial state tackled some cultural processes better than the nation-state. The Nehruvian elite, which inherited effective control after independence, faced a complex initial situation. Indeed, the issue of an official or 'national' language occasioned some of the most acrimonious debates in the constituent assembly. (Kaviraj:399)

Political linguist Hans R. Dua (1993), though in an attempt of different nature, does not go beyond showing that when the language consensus eroded, and when non-Hindi advocates adopted antagonistic posture against Hindi.¹⁵ Neither of them investigates the other face of the consensus which is evident but hardly recognised in social science discourse. In 1937, when the consensus of making Hindi the national language should have been at its peak, the chief of Madras state C. Rajgopalachari made Hindustani compulsory at high school level. The move immediately exposed the brittleness of the consensus. Rajaji, then a vocal supporter of Hindi, must have thought that under the anti-colonial enthusiasm and on the solid basis of the two decade old work of *Hindi-pracharaks* in South India, Tamilians would embrace Hindustani. He never anticipated that his nationalistic act would render Hindi as a permanent bogey of anti-north

of Hindi. The mixed influence of these *janpadeeyatas*, it seems, might have resulted in a structure not having an exclusive imprint of any particular *janpadeeya* culture.

¹⁵ According to Dua (1993), with the linguistic reorganization of provinces, the consensus for Hindi was gradually broken. C. Rajgopalachari, a strong supporter during anti-colonial movement, became a bitter critic of nationalistic assertion of Hindi advocates, and Suniti Kumar Chatterjee also ditched Hindi in sixties. In fact he was one of the three dissenters in the report of Kher Commission (1956). The title of Dua's paper indicates the usual conflation of national/official in intellectual discourse. He nonchalantly treats official as national.

Dravidian campaign. From day one of issuing the governmental order an aggressive and at times violent campaign started against it. Effigies of Rajaji and his minister P. Subbarayan burnt regularly with the cries of 'Let Hindi die and let Tamil live. Let Subbarayan die and Rajgopalachari die'. E.V. Ramaswami Naiker 'Periyar', the founder and militant leader of the anti-Brahmin movement led the protest and got arrested. The excesses committed by police took the lives of two protesters. (Ram: 1968). It was a trailer of anti-Hindi upsurge that shook Tamilnadu twenty eight year latter.

Even the non-dravidian Tamil elite knew that what Congress and Rajaji were trying to sell them was not something that belonged to the inner circles of national leadership. Hindustani or Hindi was yet to be the mode of communication among top politicians of the country though as early as in 1923 the Cocanada session of Congress had accepted it as official language by amending clause 33 of its own constitution. The new clause stipulated that every bit of the proceedings of Congress sessions must be conducted 'as far as possible' in Hindustani. Historian of Indian constitution Granville Austin has impeccably shown in his research that this shift never resulted in the replacement of English in the inner party-life of Congress. Congress leadership communicated and debated with each other in English only. The Motilal Nehru report of 1928 is known for its advocacy of establishing Hindustani-Hindi as a common language of India, but it drafted its report in English and all its deliberation were conducted in same language. The Hindi-edition of this report was probably not available even ten years after its submission. The principle of Gandhi's Hindustani was accepted but hardly put to use as a language of political discourse by national political elite. Since 1915 Gandhi became the darling of masses by addressing them in Hindustani, other leaders of Congress also chose to do the same for the sake of mobilisation. Besides, they feared Gandhi's rebuke. Once Gandhi's presence forced even Rabindranath to speak in Hindustani, but it is a matter of research whether the personal communications sent to Nehru by him were in Hindi? According to Austin, Congress reconfigured its organisation on linguistic basis but never applied itself to untangle the web of related issues: 'Throughout these years, English remained the language of independence movement, at least in its upper echelons. Little attention was paid to the details of language question, and the exact position of English in independent India seems not to have been discussed, nor the status of regional languages,

nor other details that would confront the constituent assembly, such as the language of courts, of parliament, and of the constitution itself. . . . the issue could not be put to vital test of action. It was enough at this time to proclaim that Indians must speak an Indian language.’ (p. 49).¹⁶ For all practical purposes the elite were demanding a language of Indian roots for people but all the while reserving for themselves the right to speak in English. That is precisely why the language issue put the constituent assembly and initial twenty post-colonial years under great stress and not because some cultural inadequacy of the modern Indian state as Sudipta Kaviraj would like to have us believe.

Four Discourses: The record of constituent assembly tells us that the stormy discussion on the language issue begun from 1st of August and concluded on 14th of September, 1949 when language issue figured officially on the agenda. Actually the question tested the political choice of the members first time when rules committee sat on December 14, 1946 after the initial bonhomie among members was quickly over. They had to encounter a hitherto unanticipated problem as to which language proceedings of the assembly would be conducted: in Hindustani, in English or in the mother-tongues of members? Thereafter emerged in assembly three poles, one that insisted upon the continuance of English, and the other two belonged to pro and anti-Hindi camps. When long and sharp exchanges could not generate consensus, the instrument of voting was used to decide that both, Hindustani and English, would be the medium of debate, but permission of the chair would have to be obtained if somebody wants to speak in his mother tongue. Hardly three months were passed since the first skirmish, the language question again come to fore in the subcommittee discussion on fundamental rights because members pressed for the inclusion of the right to language as the fundamental one.

As if the three-way polarisation was not enough, the language question entered into a second phase with the emergence of a fourth poles, a result of an internal split between advocates of Hindi into moderates and hardliners. So far, the difference of opinion over the character of Hindi had not precipitated inside the assembly and debates were largely conducted without being vitiated by Hindi-Hindustani division, a trend prevalent outside.

¹⁶ The narrative of the constituent assembly debate is taken mostly from Austin (2009), but I have rearranged it according to the purpose of my enquiry. I think that the four discourses, underlined by me, show the way popular understanding has been shaped around the assembly debates.

Ultimately that split occurred in the assembly on the issue of naming the language whether it should be called Hindustani or Hindi. In the fourth session of the assembly, on July 14, 1947 Vallabhbhai Patel moved the report of provincial constitutional committee. Next day there was flood of amendments. One of the important issue, among others, was the move that word Hindustani should be replaced with Hindi. According to Austin, these amendments were the direct reflection of partition that had thrown the country into a highly volatile communal situation. Supporters of Hindi argued vehemently about ‘treacherous’ Urdu-laced Hindustani, which according to them, have inflicted partition on motherland, and preferred in stead pure sanskritised Hindi. On the third day evening, Congress members of the assembly tried to tackle the issue in their sitting but to no avail. The leadership was in favour of Hindustani, but other members outnumbered them heavily. Again ballot was resorted to, to break the deadlock and by the division of 32-63 the word Hindustani was replaced with Hindi. The same episode almost repeated in the union constitutional committee and in the text of its report Hindustani got replaced by Hindi with more or less similar margin. Moderates kept supporting the cause of Hindustani after their defeat but lost the power to force the issue in their favour.

Nobody could have imagined that in course of time this particular Hindi-Hindustani episode will influence the discourse of language in at least four distinct ways.

Interestingly all four varieties are the attempted reasoning as to why Hindi failed to become the national language of India, but they arrive at differing conclusions. The most popular one among them is the line of argument that if a bridge language like Hindustani was given the status it would have definitely been fared better than sanskritised Hindi. One proponent of this discourse defines Hindustani as a language ‘without any literary or academic standing or a fixed region bound home of its own as it would have both the negative advantage of equal disability for all and the positive advantage of opportunity for participation by all linguistic groups in its development. Hindustani could have satisfied this criterion, but not Hindi’. (Rao: 1978). One can leave aside this bizarre observation about Hindustani’s literary accomplishments, but a question can be asked whether various linguistic elites belonging south of Vindhya were ready to participate in the nationalistic venture indicated here? We have seen in 1937 that the language that got opposed tooth and nail by Tamil-speakers was not the sanskritised Hindi but Gandhi’s

and Premchand's beloved Hindustani. In fact South Indian members of the assembly had taken little interest in this divide because for them it was an internal matter of North. In 1947 forces got redistributed between all four camps and the Congress members from South got swayed by the opinion that in the post-partition scenario the characteristics of Hindustani don't give enough nationalistic vibes. The second most popular discourse usually revels in the nostalgia typical of Urdu speaking Hindu-Muslim elite, now defunct but once dominant in North-Western province of Awadh. (Robinson: 1990). This argument might have a welcome desire of making Hindi more broad based, but it completely glosses over the north-south divide and betrays the tendency of treating language issue only in the domain of North.¹⁷ The third strand of discourse expresses satisfaction that Hindi ultimately could not become national language due to the fact that 'internal dissensions within Hindi led to a circumstance which turned ironically to be beneficial to the new state'. (Kaviraj: 343) I will attend to this opinion in the next part of my enquiry because it has wider ramifications.

The fourth one is the discourse of justice. It evokes a 'great legend' that insists on a story about the defeat of Hindustani in the assembly by an extremely thin majority of one vote only. Most of its proponents speak in a manner as if the band of 'Hindi-fanatics' hatched a conspiracy by spreading rumours against the bonafides of Hindustani and a sleight of hand was used in the counting of votes. This 'great legend' is taken care of by the narrative provided by Austin. We have already seen the way Hindi-Hindustani split was formalised in 1947 in which advocates of Hindustani were outnumbered heavily. Then where this instance of one vote victory came from? On August 26, 1949 Congress assembly party met to resolve the issues related to the use of numerals. After a three hour long tense and acrimonious debate voting was called by the chairmen Patabhi Sitaramayya and first show of hands counted 63 in favour of international numerals and 54 in favour of Nagri numerals. Nagri supporters then called for proper division of votes that resulted in 74-74 tie. However, the Hindi camp claimed that since one of their supporters left the house just before the voting, they should be declared victorious by one

¹⁷ While giving important details of the structure of the Hindu-Muslim elite of Awadh province, Robinson notably underlines the hierarchical positioning of Hindus and Muslims in it. According to him, Urdu of Muslims and Urdu of Hindus had a sort of diaglossical relationship in which Hindus were made to suffer from inferiority. This was the reason, mostly, many Urdu speaking Kayasthas and Kashmiri Pandits gradually shifted to Hindi's side. Alok Rai's work *Hindi Nationalism* (1990) typically represents the nostalgic attitude towards Hindustani.

vote. At this moment Sitaramayya and Nehru urged that Nagri numerals can not be forced by such a narrow margin. It was also decided that Hindi-speaking provinces would have a right to use Hindi as inter-provincial language and English will not be included in the constitutional schedule. To substantiate his version of events Austin referred to the reports published in *The Hindu* and *The Hindustan Times* of the next day.

It seems that meaning attributed to this 'great legend' is partly correct in terms of the dwindling support of Hindi camp. Two years ago they could sway overwhelming majority in their favour, but when real fight was engaged and language question came on official agenda they were left with lesser numbers. South Indians had parted their company mainly due to their aggressive posturing and over-using the majoritarian argument. Moreover, they provoked a north-south split in 1948 by fielding Purushottam Das Tandon, a prominent leader of sanskritised Hindi group, against Sitaramayya in the election of Congress presidentship. The counsel of Rajendra Prasad and Nehru to avoid north-south split went over their head, as a result of which a few of North Indian members changed the side and Sitaramayya won in close fight. The period between this election and the first six months of 1949 proved crucial for language provisions of the constitution and politics of Hindi thereafter. Two important developments happened: Hindi translation of the draft-constitution appeared and Nehru told Rajendrababu that he could not understand a single word of it. This translation was the handiwork of a committee whose character was influenced by the presence of Dr. Raghuveera, a late entrant and the one who epitomised the forces of 'Sanskrit Nationalism' in the assembly.¹⁸ Secondly, to the great annoyance of Hindi hardliners, the moderate supporters of Hindi got combined with South Indian members to work towards a possible resolution of language question. The first development contained a premonition about what would happen if development of Hindi be put to the charge of persons like Raghuveera; and the second development lead to the hammering out of Munshi-Ayyangar formula, in which Ambedkar participated crucially, the centre-piece of which was the protection of non-Hindi linguistic cultures.

¹⁸ Ramaswami's (2009) work throws ample light on this phenomenon, but this naming 'Sanskrit Nationalism' is coined by me during an intense polemics with those scholars who write on Hindi's history in English. See, Dubey (2009).

However, every possible meaning was read into language provisions and scores were settled in the public domain on their political and linguistic efficacy. Austin famously characterised them as ‘a half-hearted compromise’, a judgement that was never challenged in any substantial manner. The resentment of Hindustani supporters did not diminish as they were not persuaded by the appearance of their beloved language in article 351. Some commentators, on the other hand, came out as the worshippers of these provisions. The representative trend among social scientists and linguists clung to the typical analysis about the future of Hindi as ‘official or national’ language. The question, it seems, that no one tried to raise was that irrespective of huge pressure tactics deployed by various forces and freewheeling cross-cutting debates, whether the constitution builder reached any where near the basic goal they started with?

II

Language-Planning, Linguistic Citizenship and the Indian Context of National/Official

The formulation of article 351, the last one among eleven language provisions of the seventeenth part of the constitution, had performed an interesting trick. It took away the question of Hindi from the domains of past and present and placed it in the realm of future. The fulfilment of the protocol provided in this article needed a thorough recasting of the language that could only be done in government sponsored factory of language-planning irrespective of its history and its current shape:

It shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by assimilating without interfering with its genius, the forms, style and the expressions used in Hindustani and in other languages of India specified in the Eighth Schedule, and by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and Secondarily on other languages.¹⁹

¹⁹ Interestingly, these lines containing the prescription about the possible making of the official language are translated in Hindi by Krishna Kumar in a particular way in his article he wrote for the anthology edited by Dubey (1993). Not only he translated the word

In the mirror of social sciences, these words reflect number of significant elements constituting Indian modernity. In its evocation of ‘composite culture’ and in the idea that was ‘Hindustani’, an emphasis on secularism and communal amity can be read. For a interested party ‘Sanskrit’ indicates to the golden past and its perennial linguistic legacy. The mention of the ‘other languages of India specified in the Eighth Schedule’ has a pull towards a purported federal system and a possible balance between the centre and the states. All these aspects taken together were bound to generate conflicted readings from the complex structure of this paragraph, especially because different people had expectations of their own from the language in making. I will try to explain below the representative trends from the four main clusters of arguments.

The first kind of reading, among the several ones which prevail in the public domain, shows an attempt to listen to the silent voices and unspoken intentions of the constitution builders. It raises the question as to why those wise people should have put onus on Hindi of serving ‘as medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture’ when it was hardly needed for meeting the operational needs of government of the day? The central argument behind this understanding goes like this: a language does not have to be tempered by cultural and social processes to become media of governance. English, a language never socialised in Indian conditions, played this instrumental role with perfection. Why could the same ‘instrumentality’ not have been attributed to Hindi’s new found responsibility? Is it not the case that constitution builders chose to impose upon Hindi an organic conception of language fit only for the greater purpose of national language?²⁰

The second reading is processed in a scholarly fashion by Krishna Kumar, according to which the formulation of this paragraph was nothing but a ‘masterly act of dispute-settlement’ that ‘could not save Hindustani from disappearing from affairs of the state in the years following independence’; and due to this article only ‘the Board of Scientific

‘genius’ as ‘pravritti’ which is different from the official translation provided in the constitution, the text of whole provision was represented in such a convoluted manner that it became strangely complex. In fact on the basis of his translation only Kumar (1993) could have claimed that it was nothing but a ‘shabdjal’. He couldn’t have used equivalent expression in the English version of his article, where he was constrained to call it ‘masterful act of dispute settlement’.

²⁰ I am indebted to the students and teachers of Zakir Husain College of Delhi University for the formulation of this line of arguments while interacting with them on the issue of ‘Rashtravaad or Nationalism in Hindi’ in the winters of 2009.

Terminology, established in 1950 and later replaced by the Commission for Scientific and Technical Terminology, went about coining new terms for Hindi usage, overwhelmingly drawing upon Sanskrit.’ In his influential work Krishna Kumar also claims that ‘the state’s commitment to secularism was in no position to resist this process, firstly because the cause of Hindustani and its symbolic value has been successfully checkmated, and secondly because the bureaucratic and intellectual elites continued to remain dependent on English.’ Kumar clearly gives the impression that through article 351 advocates of Sanskritised Hindi scored a final victory, and then connects it with the designs of cultural politics of communalism that after ‘having shaped Hindi in accordance with their ideology, the Hindu revivalists were able to develop a device uniquely suited for working within the secular state’s apparatus.’ (Kumar: 1990). The reading of Krishna Kumar, ostensibly opposed to the *tatsamikaran* of Hindi, is interestingly similar to Dr. Raghuvendra’s claim that in the article 351 the constitution has given Sanskrit absolute primacy over other sources from which Hindi can be enriched.

The third attempt of meaning-making projects an understanding exactly opposite to the one arrived at by Krishna Kumar. In a long hermeneutical exercise prominent Dalit thinker Dr. Dharmaveer concludes that this piece of constitution is the best thing could have ever happened to the future of Hindi. He devotes a full chapter of his work *Hindi Ki Atma* on it and argues, ‘Those who read this article of the constitution must bear in their minds that while it specifically mentions Sanskrit by name, the name of Hindustani appears even before Sanskrit. Besides, Sanskrit is designated as no more than the source of vocabulary, but goes up to the extent of imposing a condition for assimilating the form, style and expression of Hindustani. That means Hindi goes to Hindustani at the first opportunity available and connects with Sanskrit much later. Hindi has to interact with other Indian languages after imbibing the qualities of Hindustani.’ Emphasising on Hindi’s ‘genius’, Dharmaveer completely ignores secular-communal binary erected by Krishna Kumar. He fashions his idea of Hindi as a part of the long established tradition of discourse carried out in the works of Ramvilas Sharma and Kishori Das Bajpayee by reinforcing their assertion that the Sanskrit’s motherhood claim for Hindi is unacceptable. Despite the hegemonic designs of Sanskrit, according to Dharmaveer, Hindi has been developing as per its genius. (Dharmaveer: 1998)

The representative argument of the fourth reading is articulated by Justice Gopal Rao Ekbote. In his work *A Nation without National Language*, he makes distinction between two Hindis: the one that is spoken in a large part of the country as a regional language and another that is mentioned in the article 351. The argument goes like this: the eighth schedule of the constitution contains regional languages and with them Hindi is also listed as another regional language, but the duty of Indian Union has nothing to do with it. Efforts may be done to develop it only by the governments of those states where it is the mainly spoken. The central government's sole emphasis should be on a Hindi whose nature is different from its regional variety. Two languages can be same in the form, theorises Ekbote, but their nature makes them separate. The paragraph of article 351 recommends a genius of Hindi not intrinsic to the North Indian's tongue. The people of South India must be taught, if ever, a new type of Hindi reflecting necessary attributes of our national language with which this language is bound to be equipped. Justice Ekbote lists nine elements Hindi must exhibit as a national language: cosmopolitanism, ancientness, easy inclusiveness, multi-point origin, liberal bent, ability to represent composite culture, merit and easy communicability. These attributes, according to him, are absent in Hindi as spoken in its geographical regions. (Ekbote: 1987)

These readings, along with the obvious hits, contain a few misses. The logic of the first one naturally leads to the suspicion that behind the garb of official language Hindi was, in fact, bestowed the unspoken status of national language.²¹ In accordance with a clandestine design the builders of constitution allowed the mixing of the categories of national and official. They were dealing with language issue not as a group of linguists but as nation-builders with Hindi as the corner-stone of their project. What this reading fails to explain is the fine tuning done in the constitution to delineate the limits of the influence official language can exercise in its complex relationship with the languages of the eighth schedule that are at par with Hindi in terms of any possible national status.

²¹ While the official language might work only for the rationalization of state's administration, the national language, according to Fishman (1969), serves the phenomenological aspect of socio-cultural integration and political integration rather than addressing to an objective aspect of the national integration. There are countries with more than one official language, such as Switzerland, Peru, Bolivia and Singapore, the case of more than one national language is hard to find. In that sense India is a unique country where 22 languages of the eighth schedule can be treated as national languages.

The second reading is not interested in issues about Hindi's role as national or link-language, instead it looks at the angle of developing it as a lingua-franca that can meet the discursive, educational, knowledge-making, political and social needs of its vast geographical area. It convincingly registers objections on heaping artificial sanskritised vocabulary upon official Hindi and thus making it unintelligible as well as posits its discourse in the realm of education by underlining the need for a secular culture of text books. However, after rightly valorising the spoken Hindustani for the sake of composite culture, it does not clarify about the functions this language of *haat-bazar* would have in the realm of higher education, discursive field and knowledge-making. Also, it fails to say anything about the role of classic languages like Sanskrit and Persian for this particular enterprise. D.L. Sheth, on his part, expresses similar concerns in his thesis on language problem. He is also upset with the state's project of standardisation, but, contrary of Kumar, instead of rejecting on the count of secularism sees merit in the generations educated on the basis of Hindi text books. Sheth's discourse points to the risks emanating from secular insistence on making Hindi synonymous with the spoken Hindustani all the while ignoring its necessary interaction with Sanskrit to make it vector of sophisticated discourse. Formal education, according to Sheth, is bound to incorporate in Hindi a certain formal structure without which it can not serve the realm of knowledge. (Sheth: 2009).

The third reading belongs to a prolific dalit intellectual, who, being an IAS officer, is in a position to talk about the development of the Union's official language. Dharmveer mobilises several evidences, usually ignored by other researchers, about *sarkari* Hindi and still seem to carry hope in his stride despite the fiasco of new scientific and technical vocabulary. He is expected to lash out against the social and cultural role of Sanskrit, and he rightly puts Sanskrit in the dock for excluding women and shudras from its ambit. But he is not an in-principle opponent of Sanskrit-Hindi interaction and suggests a practical model for it. Among his several suggestions, he proposes to curb Sanskrit's tendency of *samasik shabd-rachna* by imposing a limit of not more than five alphabet for new coinages. Dharmveer underlines Hindi's own methodology of coining new vocabulary. (Dharmveer: 1998).

Fourth is a reading by a South Indian intellectual who favours a gradual evolution of an entirely new language for all India purpose. The ideas of Justice Ekbote, published in 1987, were not new in the sense that in the beginning of fifties advocates of Hindi on other side of Vindhyas were animated by similar concerns. Chief Minister of Bombay state B.G. Kher, an ardent follower of Gandhi's policy on the matter, spoke about the designs of North Indians: 'Because the name of our national language is Hindi, certain Hindi-speaking provinces are trying to foist their special brand of Hindi on the whole country as its national language. But a part can never take the place of a whole; and these friends must realise that the Hindi which is contemplated by the constitution will be a matter of slow growth and can not be identical with the Hindi either of Uttar Pradesh or Bihar or of Madhya Pradesh. All these will make a valuable contribution to the formation of the national language, but they are not the 'national' language.'²² Either emanating from Kher or Mangankhai Desai or from G.V. Mavalankar, these voices caused much discomfort to the likes of Purushottam Das Tandon and Dheerendra Verma, stalwarts of Hindi movement. This particular discourse, however, gave rise to an influential group of elite who believed in the need of language-engineering.

Besides the obvious variance in their main positions, these four strands have one thing in common: they do not differentiate between concepts of official and national, and they explicitly avoid talking in term of link-language. Even Dharmveer, while attending to the needs of official language, mixes up official with national. This tendency reaches to a polemical point in Sudipta Kaviraj who attacks the intentions of constitution-builders on this basis. Readers will recognise that I have already quoted a line of his formulation earlier in this paper:

Its (constituent assembly) proceedings also showed another ironical fact: how deep the influence of European precedence was on the minds or the Indian intelligentsia. Interestingly, even moderates on the language issue conceded the idea having a single language being a precondition of firm, unassailable nationalism. Hindi remained anomalously placed inside the constitutional structure, since it was stretched to Bihar to some part of Punjab. This might have encouraged some kind of interest coalition among them, and since their resources taken

²² This very interesting idea of having a Hindi, which is not the lingua-franca of North India, is also manifested in the insistence of making Hindi more sanskritised so that it can be accepted by non-Hindi speech communities, particularly Bengali and Dravidian languages, more easily. It was advanced during the discussion on my paper 'Hindi Ka Humiliation' (2003) by Thomas Pentham and Sudipta Kaviraj in a workshop held at Ranikhet in 2003 on the theme of 'Political Theory of Humiliation'.

together would have been quite substantial, this may have renewed the conflicts of constituent assembly once more. A potentially difficult situation was avoided precisely due to the internal divisiveness of the Hindi-language area. ... Internal dissension within Hindi led to a circumstance which turned ironically to be beneficial to the new state. The potential mobilisation for Hindi as 'national' language which would compulsorily replace English, and make India look more like a unilingual European nation-state failed to gather momentum, because it was hard to decide which kind of Hindi would these privileges of universal aggrandizement. (Kaviraj: p)

Nothing can be flatter than this observation. Who was not inspired with the European ideologies and precedence of nation-building? Let alone the language episode, every word of the constituent assembly debate is marked with its imprint. We do not need profound wisdom to declare that, but one wonders whether the idea of monolingual sub-nationality, which Gandhi and Congress advocated since twenties, is less European in its origin? Kaviraj does not object to it on the same grounds of monolinguality, and not only that he tells us about the life and times of modern Bengali in the same way a Hindi 'fanatic' would have liked to construct the narrative of modern Hindi. But making *janpadeeya bhashas* of Bengal a lesser entity as 'dialects' and then erasing their literary, cultural and linguistic nomenclatures by dubbing them 'limpid' or 'folkish', he deploys a tested trick from the repertoire of European linguistic nationalism. Kaviraj is so protective about the monolinguality of his own cultural community that he likes to refer the Nehru's suggestion for the merger of Bengal and Bihar as 'intensely unpopular'. He comments in the footnote about the 'unpractical extreme' to which such ideas went, but, theoretically speaking, at least he could have treated it sympathetically as a possible instance for great multilingualism of neighbouring cultures. In stead of taxing himself in performing the act of cultural erasure he might have done well to use his sophisticated skills in looking for innovations in the ultimate formulations by the assembly.

By 1949 constitution-builders were running against time and struggling against a siege from all sides. Credit should be given to them that in such a crisis ridden situation they were able to come up with at least two brilliant acts of innovations manifested in Munshi-Ayyangar formula. From a long running debate in which official/national seemed to imbricate so tightly, they demarcated the boundaries of these ideas from each other by refusing the status of national language to Hindi; and made an arrangement by which every language of the eighth schedule was be deemed national and by its implication

could claim the resources of the Indian Union for its development. We have already seen in the first part of this enquiry that in the context of anti-colonial legacy the idea of *Rashtra-bhasha* was never nurtured in the European context of ‘one language-one nation’, and in fact got equated with *antarbhasha* or link-language. The report of the Official Language Commission (1956) reminds us about a ‘private sector of national life’ in which this *antar-bhasha* was to be processed:

While the constitution properly limits itself to the question of replacing English by Indian linguistic media in the official business of the country, there are other fields of activity, within, so to say, the ‘private sector of national life’, wherein the question of a single linguistic medium for all pan-Indian levels of intercourse is of the highest significance. In these fields there is little or no scope for legislating with reference to any specific language policy; and the linguistic pattern must be allowed to develop as it may be the voluntary choices of the people and in response to the needs and the opportunities of the situation. After initiating the necessary steps for the development of the Union language as well as of regional languages, this sector may be left free for all the different linguistic media to attain their appropriate coverage with reference to the needs and opportunities in different field, evolving in due course a general linguistic equilibrium. (Kher, p)

At another place, the report of the commission clarifies that law, judiciary and public administration falls in the ambit of public sector and the fields of education, the press, trade, commerce and industry, the learned professionals and public life generally are the private sector. This constitutionally mandated commission, which produced voluminous but engrossing and still relevant document, had 21 members drawn mostly from the political and cultural fields. Compare to their detailed, nuanced and differentiated approach toward language policy and practices, most social scientists fare abysmally. Kaviraj’s flatness might have one special reason behind it: he may not be familiar with the debates and developments the sphere of Hindi went through during the fifties and particularly the period of sixties which he focusses on. Via Namvar Singh’s *Doosari Parampara* he recalls his mentor Hazari Prasad Dwivedi, perhaps the only literary member of the commission from the world of Hindi, but he seems to me somewhat oblivious of a power-shift taking shape on the ground. Sixties was the decade when the advocates of *tatsam* Hindi had finally run out of their steam with their new coinages left in disuse by the overwhelming majority of creative writers. The community of Hindi’s

lexicographers, grammarians and linguists were too contemptuous to the project of *tatsamikaran*²³ to recommend those contrived words. The overall rejection this project had faced was not surprising if we care to look back on Hindi's rich and powerful pedigree from the following quotation of Mahaveer Prasad Dwivedhi. Way back in 1907, Acharya Dwivedi has spared no words to admonish those who wanted to impose Sanskrit on Hindi:

No matter how deeply you look at the grammar of Hindi, no matter how extensively you reflect upon it, the impact of Sanskrit may be found very little even if a deliberate search is made for it. ... I find no reason why difficult *tatsam* words of Sanskrit should be used as long as the words of spoken language are available. Is *ghar* a word bad enough to be replaced with *griha*? What is the deficiency of *kalam* compare to *lekhani*? Why should the meaning of *ooncha* be conveyed by *uchcha*? ... It will not be wise step to stall the natural development of our language by mixing it with Sanskrit, a language spoken thousands years ago. After all liberty extends a same benefit to everybody. Who does not love one's freedom? Then, why should Hindi remain captive of Sanskrit? Must it not be made free henceforth? The words that are in vogue whether belonging to Sanskrit, Persian and English must be deployed because they have become one with Hindi and nobody should despise them. ... Some of Kashi people are making Hindi too difficult. They put much emphasise on Sanskrit. That is why Sanskrit is able to influence Hindi. In Kashi some people show their naiveté by revelling in highbrow Hindi. There is no harm in using a Sanskrit word if Hindi cannot provide a certain expression, but to make Hindi a highbrow language is akin to axing ones own leg. (Dwivedi: 2001)

It is another matter that the project of *tatsmaikaran* was far from over. Its impact was still felt in the domain of *sarkari* Hindi and by implication in the areas of 'private' sector that overlapped with it. But one can not ignore that power-shift as a potent emerging reality by which the old 'right-leaning' Hindi-elite²⁴ was pushed to the margins by the language-strategists of Marxist variety like Rahul Sanskrityayan, Rangeya Raghava, Muktibodh, Ramvilas Sharma and Shivdan Singh Chauhan on the one hand, and by the

²³ Campaign of *tatsamikaran* or purification moves in two directions: it brings words and expressions from the cultural and ethnic past, and purges those words that are deemed foreign. These are the processes common to almost every language, French, Hebrew, Spanish, Turkish, Urdu, German or Hindi to name a few. This tendency, on the one hand, enriches the language up to some extent, but on the other hand, the combine effect of both processes inflicts enormous distortions. Whatever the effect of purification may be, these campaign do not last very long due to their artificial nature. The idea of the purification of Hindi, it seems, have ultimately met the same fate.

²⁴ Gould (2002) has given an excellent account of the political life of these 'right-leaning' advocates of Hindi. According to him Sampooranand, Purushottam Das Tandon and Algoo Rai Shastree had no links with Hindutva forces of their times. In fact, they were known as Congress-left and members of Congress Socialist group who fought against right-wing tendencies inside the party. Though Gould has discussed about the place of tradition in their understanding of secularism or socialism, but this relationship is yet to be probed deeply. Certainly it will have serious ramifications for secular discourse.

array of modernist liberals lead by Agyeya on the other. This new cultural elite, despite ideological differences, was not amenable to be appropriated by the forces of Hindutva represented by RSS or Arya Samaj. Besides, Sanskritised *komalkant padavali* of the *Chhayavad* was no longer the norm and modern Hindi poetry deployed with great finesse a language what Gandhi and Premchand would have liked to believe as Hindi-Hindustani. In every sense of term, the linguistic idea of Hindustani and its attributes had been completely assimilated by the newly developed journalistic and literary Hindi. So, it was not the split or antagonistic dissension in the social sector of Hindi, which according to the claim of Kaviraj saved the day for Indian state, it was a unity of creative purpose reflecting in the enriching debates about the impact of a certain cultural modernity on North Indian society. Not interested in foisting a single language of their choice on non-Hindi regions, this new leftist and modernist cultural elite was uncomfortable with the idea of Majoritarianism, for its horizon was marked with the following theorisation:

article 343 of the constitution begins with these words: ‘The official language of the Union shall be Hindi in Devnagari script. But what were the functions of this official language? As everyone knows, English as the official language of the state usurped numerous functions and rights of the languages of other nationalities. Not granting a sufficient measure of national autonomy to the various states of the Union, to replace English with Hindi is tantamount to following a policy of coercion. (Sharma 2006: 105)

Ramvilas Sharma, while discussing the issue in the pages of Communist Party journal *New Age*, went on to quote Shri Ram Sharma, the secretary of the Hyderabad Rajya Hindi Pracahr Sabha: ‘In fact, only when the provincial languages become the media of knowledge and the state work in their own provinces will Hindi truly become *Rashtra-bhasha*.’ (Sharma:). With the benefit of hindsight we do know that Sharma’s theories, formulated during the sixties, deeply influenced the popular understanding of Hindi intellectuals in coming decades. In this particular piece of work, incidentally written in English, he brought on an extraordinary insight by making distinction between the concepts of official language, a working necessity for government as well as for people; and compulsory official language, to his mind an anti-people anti-national formulation.

As disappointed as he was by the fact that the adoption of Official Language Act by various assemblies including Hindi-provinces could not kick-start the long process of

establishing Indian languages in state administration, Sharma put his focus solely on the replacement of English from administration and education. On the other hand, despite the ideological affinity with him Sankrityayan and Chauhan had a different vision and pressed for a re-look on Hindi's umbilical relationship with *janpadeeya bhashas*. In stead of the terms 'Hindi's janpadeeya bhashas', they were in favour of reconfiguring it as 'janpadeeya bhasha's Hindi'. To cut the long story short, the discourse in and about Hindi among its intellectuals was processed on a terrain dimensions of which our esteemed social scientists still knew little about.

Language-planning: All this goes to say that the story of post-colonial language-planning ²⁵ was bound to be at variance with that of Europe. It would be interesting to note that the language-planning, a ubiquitous phenomenon found all over the western world and Africa and in Asia (Japan, China, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia) too, has been the necessary ingredient of modern statecraft much before the rise of this theory among linguists. Gandhi imagined that the state led by Nehru will do something that Japan did. In 1942 he made an example of Japan by emphasising one aspect of its language planning that they 'economise their energy. Those who need to learn them do so for enriching Japanese thought with knowledge which the West alone can give... The rapid progress was due to the restriction of the learning of the Western mode to a selected few and using that for transmission of the new knowledge among the Japanese through their own mother-tongue.' (Laiten).

According to the theory developed in accordance with European practice, India's language-planning could have proceeded successively in three stages. The first one, known as the stage of multilingualism, covers the period in which various speech-communities make demands and wage struggles for state recognition. The government of the day is expected to accede to them hesitatingly but surely. But the process of recognition is incumbent upon making one selected language as 'first among equals' to

²⁵ Uriel Weinrich had used the expression 'language-planning' first time in 1953, and thereafter it was used as a concept in 1959 while analyzing the language problem of Norway. After 1966 it has been consistently used for the language problems of developing nations. Obviously, various modern states have been doing some sort of language-planning much before this concept came into currency among linguists. While clearly not working on the basis of any well thought out linguistic design, many elements of the state's linguistic strategy were similar to what is described in the concerning literature. Joshua A. Fishman has made great reputation by working on this theme.

ensure rationalisation of state machinery.²⁶ After the first stage begins the long drawn out second stage in which constitutional, legal and cultural technologies are deployed to make other linguistic cultures digest the super-ordinate status of that privileged language. Dubbed as the stage of language-rationalisation, this period creates the circumstances of a necessary third stage known as language-maintenance in which the state takes various steps for the promotion of those languages that may have been left behind and felt marginalised in the process. This pattern has succeeded historically in various countries where rulers have imposed one language-one script on an entire multilingual social reality in the process encountering little resistance and by spending less resources compared to what must have been expended in imposing one currency, one criteria of conscription and one religion.²⁷ As rightly pointed out by David Laitin, every success achieved in obtaining linguistic uniformity was conditioned on a complex configuration of socio-economic and political interaction of forces. Countries like India with their post-colonial reality were not commensurable with this model. Radically different from Europe, Japan and China, India's nationalism was a sum total of powerful sub-nationalities emphatically claiming cultural autonomy. Besides, its elite emerging through a long process of tutelage under colonial modernity was structurally divided in two parts-- political and bureaucratic. The former was intrinsically brought up with the primacy of the idea of the national as the culmination of resistance to colonialism, While the later's training as conservator of colonialism hardly allowed them to look beyond the idea of a *mai-baap* kind of state.²⁸ In this sense India's colonial experience in the context of language was even different from the Indonesian and Malaysian case.

The peculiarity of the Indian case, though, is generally not lost on more perceptive social scientists and often comes into play in their work, but when focusing on the question of language they, perhaps inadvertently, accept a frame in which their discourse either

²⁶ Rationalisation of the state machinery has been a concern not limited to only modern states. In India's medieval period Persian was the language in which Moghals or Marathas did state rationalisation. In some areas of north Brij was also used as language of darbar, and in South India Tamil was the state language.

²⁷ Most of these successes belong to the period before Second World War, when kings, emperors and autocrat nation-builders could force their chosen language on a multilingual scene. Languages like French, English, Spanish and German were rammed through by the force of state, and unilingual citizenship was carved out from the practicing linguistic plurality. When the age of democracy arose in forties, this type of language-planning became impossible.

²⁸ For this distinction, see Laitin (1989).

become a lament that India is a nation without a national language, or keep suspecting that our elite would have imposed one language on a multilingual reality had they not been thwarted by the designs of history. The Indian state and its builders, in both cases, become target of their derision. One wonders whether a long and uninterrupted series of statements on the part of Gandhi, Nehru and others, and a clear enunciation of purpose by the articles (from 343 to 351) of the constitution was nothing but a larger design of deception played out most unsuccessfully in last one hundred years? Did these nation-builders always conspire to kill or subordinate languages like Tamil, Bengali, Gujarati, Telugu and Marathi by bringing Hindi as a sole language of nation after first fifteen years of the constitution? Obviously for some social scientists post-colonial musings of Nehru and his rather blunt speeches in the Parliament along with the several statements of purpose made by Hindi stalwarts are not the enough demonstration of the fact that overwhelming majority of elite was convinced about India as not being the fit case for 'one nation-one language' formula. The truth remains, however, that the mistakes, goof-ups and vacillations Indian elite can be accused off were actually the consequences emanating from a language-planning of plural kind, a perspective rather new in the concerned literature. (Singh: 1992).

When the Indian government embarked upon language-planning of its own, Hindi and other languages had already travelled far too long on the path of modernisation by the dint of the voluntary efforts²⁹ made by their language-elite and strategists. The political and literary self-image of these speech-communities had already been constructed up to the level of easy differentiation even between their early and newly developed forms. The option of realising an ideal of unilingual citizenship therefore was just not available to Indian elite. In order to have several official languages in stead of one, the language-planning commenced simultaneously at the levels of states and the Union, with former not subordinated to the latter in their efforts. The lament expressed by Kher Commission

²⁹ Languages do need state support, but they just can not do without sustained voluntary effort. The stunted growth of Urdu is a typical example of the fact that the state sponsorship is not the panacea of the internal problems of a language. Voluntary spirit has played a historical role in the linguistic, political and geographical development of Hindi, perhaps far more crucial then the state support. The thread of its history can be picked up from nineteenth century, but it acquired an all-India character when in 1918 Gandhi founded Dakshin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha. Subsequently prachar sabhas appeared in almost every non-Hindi area through out the country. The function of non-state players in giving impetus and direction to the growth of Hindi is a theme that has yet to be attended properly.

was caused precisely because it did not find enough progress being made at either level. At this point another related question presents itself: did the elite secretly contemplate the alternative of a unilingual state when demands for linguistic reorganisation were hanging fire? It is necessary to clear the decks on this issue: Nehru only had two options and both represented two kinds of multilingualism, one with the provinces reconfigured on the basis of mixed-up speech-communities, and the other on the basis of making one speech-community dominant but keeping significant numbers of minority language speakers attached with it. The report of the Dar Commission (1948) appointed by the constituent assembly to investigate the issues of national integration and efficient administration bore ample evidence of this fact. To find the right choice of policy, Congress did not leave any stone unturned and appointed its own commission too whose inquiries were conducted personally by the troika of Nehru, Sitaramayya and Patel. Both commissions reached similar conclusions that any effort of creating unilingual province would generate newer linguistic minorities. (Schwartzberg: 2009). Ultimately it was a choice of two multilingualisms, out of which Nehru liked the first one, but the political developments favoured for the other one. According to the second piece of common wisdom arrived at by both commissions, India, under a necessary multilingual future, needed an indigenous link-language to connect the people, just as the elite were connected by the medium of English. Hindi fitted the bill perfectly and perhaps in their heart of heart the constitution-builders must have liked to think that if engineered anew in the limited role of the Union's official language, it will make rapid advance as the all India link-language. Paradoxically, the case proved exactly opposite.

III

Sarkari Bhasha: the Case of a Double Subversion

The language-planning inaugurated by the constitution demanded unity of purpose and action from the elite, political and bureaucratic. On the surface, the recommendations

made by Kher Commission reflected lots of hope,³⁰ but at several places its enquiry indicted the Indian state. The development of Hindi terminology, to begin with, was attempted by Ministries under the Union government, and Hindi became the medium of the training in Army and its Roman version was utilised for record-keeping as well. The Post and Telegraph Department admirably came up with Hindi morse code within no time. Instructions were issued that letters and notes on files may be attempted in Hindi. Besides, the government took initiative to erect an institutional structure, as a result of which period of 1951 to 1964 saw the activities of the Board of Scientific and Technical Terminology, Central Hindi Directorate, Kendriya Hindi Shikshan Mandal and Akhil Bharteeya Hindi Sanstha Sangh. Ironically, this 'formal compliance', according to Laitin 'hid practical subversion'. Hindi was slated to replace English in 1965 and time was flying away, but apart from name plates on departmental doors government could not claim any thing substantial. Kher Commission spent most of its time asking for an integrated plan of action covering all ministries and departments, but did not get any in return, let alone any concrete course of action for future. The Commission was disappointed to know that the government lacked the estimate of total work that may be needed for changing the linguistic media of administrative staff. A similar situation was encountered by the Parliamentary Committee for Official Language after two years. Both, the commission and the committee, became convinced that English will not be replaced by Hindi at end of constitutionally mandated period.

In a late response to the criticism made by two enquiries the central government prepared a time bound programme in 1961, but to no avail and Hindi remained where it was in the departmental culture of the Union. By the time Kendriya Hindi Samiti was constituted and integrated administrative terminology was published, the deadline of 1965 was already two year old. Only 13 central offices could have boasted the appointments of Hindi translators by 1968-69. The home ministry report for the same year informed that out of 26,487 letters only 8,611 were written in Hindi because typewriters for the purpose were few and far between. Though allowed to do file-notings in Hindi, officers just did not care to take any such initiative and nobody among their political rulers compelled them either. The targets for Hindi-promotions projected for the year of 1968-69 remained

³⁰ Sirohi (1987) has dealt with these recommendations in detail.

unachieved even after a decade. When every bit of administrative manuals and other literature should have been translated, by 1967 only 95 acts and 64 rules (4,343 pages) appeared in Hindi. Above all, even this small amount of translation was constructed in long winding sentences and peppered heavily with jaw-breaking *tatsam* terminology. (Gupt: 1997). No amount of attractive data presentation and passionate claims, some times more convincing than white lies, could not hide this failure of astonishing proportions.³¹ Rationalisation done in the favour of Hindi begged appreciation only from one quarter, when a researcher from Pakistan lamented about his nation-state not taking matching steps for the sake of Urdu. (Zaman:1984). Since the necessary steps to carve out a *sarkari bhasha* were just not taken, the assessment of its success and failure could have been at best tentative. What we got surely, instead, is a story that tells us about a historical sabotage the constitutional project was allowed to be subjected to. The growth of *sarkari bhasha* got stunted at the point of its birth with its one end being manipulated by Union bureaucracy and the other dominated by the forces of what I call ‘Sanskrit Nationalism’ grossly represented in the persona of Dr. Raghuvvera.

Raghuvvera’s Handiwork: The person who formulated the methodology and norms adopted for translating administrative manuals, procedures and terminology was convinced that every word of English must be replaced with an equivalent Hindi word. Besides this insistence on word for word, this theory of translation had another aspect that every shade of meaning that an English word might be having, must be complemented with a separate Hindi word. As if this was not enough, Dr. Raghuvvera had one more thing up his sleeve. The words designated as *paribhashik*, in his elaborately considered opinion, had no chance to be easily communicative because they must exhibit their intrinsic quality of being difficult and complex. Working on the basis of these theories Raghuvvera nonchalantly upturned the Nehru’s idea of a simple *parbhashik shabdavali*.³² In an instance of much later date, the disaster inbuilt in this approach was

³¹ Hindi Divas is celebrated every year on September 14 with fanfare, and claims are being made about the progress of Hindi as official language. For a recent example, see Upadhyay (2011).

³² Nehru was in favour of a simple translation of English terms used in administration, but his hope was belied when Raghuvvera declared that difficulty should be taken as intrinsic for *parbhashik* equivalents of English terms. Why did Nehru allow him free reign? For the comprehensive answer of this question, insider scene of the politics of fifties will have to be probed. Besides, it seems to me that the hold of Sanskrit on the minds of post-colonial leadership, whether Nehru or Ambedkar, was a crucial factor in the play of politico-cultural forces of those times.

felt by Hindi poet Ashok Vajpeyi, when, as a district collector in Madhya Pradesh, he found himself at a loss to explain to a peasant the contents of a letter written to him in Hindi by his own administration.³³ The inability that was forced equally upon a peasant and a distinguished man of letters was the net result of *sarkari bhasha* constructed through *Raghuveeri* translation. Under the influence of the ideas wielded by Raghuveera, ironically celebrated by a handful of his admirers as the Panini of modern India, it was decided that if English text uses the words like ‘prerogative’, ‘right’ and ‘privilege’ then Hindi must have their equivalents as *visheshadhikar*, *adhikar* and *paramadhikar*. He used to give instructions that ‘Ordinary people might do with only one word, but experts must have three words for they can’t do with only one. no, this will not work. *Paribhashik shabdavali* can never be simple. May be you can simplify language to teach the kids, but not *paribhashik shabda*. Simple words are the ones spoken by the likes of illiterates, coolies, children and country people. whenever you confront this situation, you must convince your officers that simplifying language would result in removing the *paribhashikness* of *paribhashik bhasha*.³⁴

He was a scholar of Sanskrit, but not in the mode of Kishori Das Bajpeyee who worked relentlessly to make Hindi independent of Sanskrit. Instead, he referred to the constitution repeatedly to claim that Sanskrit has to be the principal source of vocabulary for official Hindi. Also, he said, ‘though it is not mentioned in the constitution, but same is true for other languages too.’ Under these considerations Raghuveera went on to coin new words by deploying twenty *upsargas*, eighty *pratyayas* and fifty *dhatu*s of Sanskrit. Dead against the idea of Hindustani, Raghuveera opposed any transaction between official Hindi and other Indian languages, *janpadeeya bhashas* and Urdu being anathema to him. In order to translate every shadow of meaning an English word might exhibit, he recommended translating ‘information’ in the context of newspaper as *visoochna*, for radio *anusoochna* and for government *adhisoochna* when a simple word like *soochna* could have easily worked for all three purposes. Even before the project of *paribhashik shabdavali* landed in his lap, these intentions were already become public by the

³³ Vajpai narrated this anecdote in a function at IIC. Otherwise also, in one of his articles (2001) he showed his discomfort about Sanskrit’s intervention in Hindi.

³⁴ Quoted in Dharmveer (1987) from an article of Raghuveera titled ‘Paribhashik Shabda’. For Raghuveera’s ideas, see Hindi translation of his anthology (1998).

publication of his *The Great English-Hindi Dictionary*. He used *kulya* for *nahar* and *rathya* for *sadak*, and was notoriously known for his uses like *audhhatya*, *aunnatya*, *yaatharthya*, *eeshat*, *alulayit kesh*, *pranrityaman mayor*, *gaddalika pravah*. The linguistic tendency, he was leading to, believed in writing *nepalz* for arsenic in place of popularly known *sankiya*. Similarly sulphur (*gandhak*) for him was *shulbari*, auction (*neelam*) was *kosh-vikray*, octroi (*chungee*) was *dvaradey*, *durbeen* was *dooreksh*, clerk was *lipik*, cheque was *dhanadesh*, *divaliyapan* was *nashtanidhi* and *tahseel* was *bhukti*. Raghuveera instructed that budget should be written as *aay-vyayak*, station as *sthatra*, pen as *masipath*, ticket as *sangyanpatra*, bulb as *vidyutkand*, *ekar* as *prahal*, inch as *prangul*, yard as *yishti* and ton as *privratta*. He founded a *sarkari* Hindi deliberately divested with number of popular Hindi words. (Dharmveer 1987:)

Nevertheless, not every word coined by Raghuveera was useless. We deploy today many of his coinages such as *vaidh*, *vidhivat*, *vidhayak*, *sansad*, *saansad*, *adheekshak*, *nirikshak*, *prastav*, *vidheyak*, *pradhikar*, etc. He should be credited to provide a method by which we coin a number of new words by using *an-* and *a-* for *un-* and *a-*, *prati* for *anti*, *adhi* for *super*, *dvi* for *di-* and *tri* for *tri-*. But this amount of success pales in insignificance when compared to the distortions introduced by him. Balbeer Singh Sirohi, otherwise an admirer, puts Raghuveera's work in a critical perspective, 'But for the contrived words introduced by him in *shabdavali*, his contribution in developing scientific vocabulary would have been considered great, especially if he had used a few of foreign *dhatu*s, *pratyayas* and *uspargas* in stead of taking a fundamentalist position of accepting only the ones from Sanskrit.... The claim that most of the *paribhashik shabd*s coined by him will be instrumental in the development of Indian languages, has not been proved correct. It is a common knowledge that they adorn only the dictionary prepared by him. Besides, on his behalf several words got coined in course of time only for heaping ridicule on Hindi, a tendency that worked as a major barrier in the success of the official language.' (Sirohi1987:112)

Bizarre and unacceptable as it was, this *sarkari* Hindi did not escape resistance inside the government. The official language department (Home Ministry) has published a collection of its orders in which the mid-seventies emerges as the point when the legacy

of Raghuvēera was challenged. The office memorendums of 1976 and 1988 clearly defines the official language as neither heavily laced with Sanskrit nor as English in Devnagri, and prefers to conceive and write drafts originally in Hindi's simple declarative sentences to avoid the strange translatorial expressions. These memorandums characterise Official Hindi not as some thing from another planet and insist upon as having it simple, easily communicative, suffused with popular words and expressions, if needed, from other sources with English terms written in parentheses. Same instructions regarding official language is given by Sarkaria Commission constituted to investigate centre-state relationship.³⁵ To consolidate the same trend, a general order was issued covering every department and ministry in 2011.³⁶ But, this late correction at one end proved insufficient to change the trend, because at the other end members of the Union bureaucracy were not ready to accept Hindi as the language of administration.

Contours of Another Subversion: Since 1922 for the members of the Indian Civil Services the knowledge of local languages was deemed compulsory, but this important condition was removed for the recruitment for its new edition, the Indian Administrative Services. In post-colonial India, the community of IAS officers, though in small numbers, hold every crucial post at the Union and in the states. Gradually the bureaucracies of the states and the Union went through a process of differentiation when the officers of Provincial Civil Service (PCS), trained in the dominant language of the concerned state along with English, begin to discharge duties in the administration structure of provinces. The duties are in the nature of second in command as district collectorship and job of the secretaries remained with IAS officers. Consequently, in the states PCS got mixed-up with IAS, but the Union administration remained exclusively in the hands of English-only cadres of IAS.

³⁵ For details of these orders, see *Hindi Adeshon Ka Ke Prayog Sambandhi Sankalan* (1986), and for Sarkaria Commission's instructions, see Dharmveer (1987).

³⁶ A welcome order indeed, because it has finally thrown legacy of Raghuvēera in the dustbin of history, but ended up generating lot of controversy because it chose to illustrate Hindi's new trend by giving unpalatable examples of Hinglish. For an idea of this debate, see: shabdacharcha@googlegroup.com.

This structure of bureaucracy impacted language-planning differently as in states English was replaced as the language of administration haltingly but steadily,³⁷ whereas in the Union administration nothing of this sort happened at all. IAS officers as the mainstay of the government of Delhi had never tried to adopt Hindi as the medium of governance even at the level of experiment. As one scholar points out that IAS ‘has a long history of English language enculturation. English language competence (and perhaps ‘gentlemanly’ behaviour) legitimated their role as highly paid servants of the state. Giving up English as the medium of communication for the all India services would have threatened their ‘cultural capital’. And so, rather than press for a change-over to Hindi (as was stipulated in the constitution), the IAS and other civil services marginalised Hindi, giving it budgets and symbolic importance, without diminishing the central role of English in bureaucratic communication. ... ’ (Laitin). IAS officers, though a large percentage of them were from South India, proved willing to learn the language of their chosen cadre provinces because it became the new condition of their service in sixties, but the language of inter-state communication remained English. The Kher commission, on its part, underlined the contradiction when it observed, ‘the problem of switching over the administration to the regional languages is much simpler in the states, where generally speaking, the personnel in the government establishments were drawn largely from the linguistic groups to whose language the switch-over is to take place.’ (Kher: 130). It seems that the regional elite was able to earn support of their state bureaucracy more successfully on the language issue, but the elite at Delhi never got the loyalties of the Union bureaucracy for the same purpose.

Anti-Hindi Movement: The double subversion, analysed above, damaged the chances of Hindi badly, but the final straw came from the politics of language that typified the state of Madras. This Congress ruled province was engulfed in anti-Hindi fire just a few weeks before the constitutionally ordained moment of 1965, when youths and students led by C.N. Annadurai’s Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), unleashed unprecedented anger and violence on the streets of the South Indian metropolis. Since the very adoption of the

³⁷ With the notable exception of Pashchim Bang, erstwhile state of West Bengal, where administration from Writer’s Building is still being conducted in English and role of Bengali as official language is limited to the lower echelon of governance, regional languages have finally replaced English in provinces. While travelling in countryside and in semi-urban areas, one can hardly find the wall-writing or boards on shops in English. But, among urban elite of every region English is still a top priority language.

constitution, the elite members of Tamil speech-community were apprehensive about their chances in the all India civil services after the final-changeover. Politically born and brought up on the diet of anti-Hindi politics, first by Self Respect Movement and then by the Dravid nationalism, Tamil youths thought that their traditional upper-hand in the selection process of these services will be jeopardised if they were forced to compete in a language other than English. Sensitive to these concerns, Nehru and Congress began a process of mitigation in the party organisation as well as in government. On April 5, 1954 the working committee of Congress recommended that ‘progressively the examination for the all India services should be held in Hindi, English and the principal regional languages, and candidate may be given the option of use any of these languages for the purpose of examinations.’ (Kumarmangalam, p. 219-30). The government approved it and the Home Minister issued a statement in Parliament on the second day of May next year. In 1956 came the report of Kher Commission with a suggestion that ‘as and when other regional languages become medium of instruction in the universities up to graduation stage as Hindi has done, the admission of other linguistic media will have to be considered.’ In 1959, speaking on the report of the parliamentary committee on official language, Nehru clarified his own understanding of the issue: ‘I am perfectly clear in my mind that for any foreseeable time there should be no bar, in the sense of compulsory knowledge of Hindi, to the recruitment of persons in the services. If a man does not know one word of Hindi, he still ought to be able to be recruited. ... When I said that there should be no imposition of Hindi, what I meant was this. Whether it is Madras, Andhra, Kerala or any other any region, I do not wish to impose a language on that State in the sense in which the State will take it as an imposition. ... I do not like dates in such matters. We start movements and processes and give the lead in certain directions, and we adjust to developments; keeping in view our objectives.’ (Nehru: 151-52). To legalise Nehru’s assurance a bill was moved and the official language act of 1963 got passed in the parliament. This small break-up of events tells us at least one thing that right from the constitutional provisions to the political will and action of the government of the day, the chances for anti-Hindi provocation were kept assiduously at minimum.

But, Tamilians had structural reasons behind their grievances that could only be addressed at the level of their own politics. In the context of becoming official language

Hindi was seen taking rapid strides in its geographical areas during mid-fifties, whereas in Madras that process was just about to take its first step. In 1965, when the Tamil elite could not have complained about being hampered due to incomplete linguistic reorganisation of the provinces, this process was still in its infancy. Compared to Tamilnadu and to the other hub of anti-Hindi activities West Bengal, Hindi had entered in North Indian Universities faster as medium of instruction, begun to make its presence felt at least in some areas of administration and certainly become media of proceedings in lower courts. (Kher:). For ordinary Tamil youths, on the contrary, option of having higher studies in their mother-tongue was not available, and for English educated ones imagined removal of English as medium of examinations was no less than scary. Political opposition, not able to turn heat on the Congress led government even in a year of extraordinary price rise, found it easier to mobilise the energies of youth on the language issue. Once trapped in the self-perpetrated vicious circle of violence begetting violence, the new force on the horizon, DMK, tried to wriggle out but got increasingly sucked into it, mainly because the aggressive postures of its more militant elements led by M. Karunanidhi. The agitation's connection with Swatantra Party brought on board two biggest of Tamil mill owners Thiagraja Chettiayar and G.D. Naidu as the promoters of Madras State Anti-Hindi Conference. But as Swatantra Party leader, Rajaji did not secure much political mileage from it apart from having the dubious distinction of causing detriment to Hindi whether in support or opposition. To the good fortune of the DMK, its politics was aided by the combined ineptness of Shastri's government at the Centre and of chief minister Bhaksvatsalam, a less astute protégé of Kamraj. At the one end of the rapid political developments, anti-Hindi politics resulted in the alliance of four South Indian states, and at the other end of Delhi, disturbing factional realignments appeared in Congress party. Though the movement subsided after sixty days, its rhetoric kept up the pressure and in 1967 a modified official language bill was moved in the parliament. Hindi areas reacted sharply and aggressive an *Angreji Hatao* Campaign was launched in North India because bill under discussion had a provision that English will remain the associate official language as long as a single non-Hindi province would oppose its removal. (Ram:). The fate of the official language of the Union since then has remained more or less sealed but for only two changes in the position: in 1975 a full fledged

official language department was constituted in the ministry of home affairs, and next year saw the passage of another official language act under which provinces were divided in three categories. The centre is now expected to correspond with the states of A category (Haryana, Himanchal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Delhi and Andaman Nicobar) in Hindi only; for the states of B category (Odissa, Punjab, Gujrat, Maharashtra and Assam) translation in English was to be attached with the letters written mainly in Hindi; and to the category C (states of South India and West Bengal) the language of correspondence remained English with Hindi translations tagged with it.

For a closer analysis the following question needs to be asked: Under the light of above facts can it be construed that the language-planning and removal of English from the administration as its centre-piece was condemned to a half-baked success from its very beginning? At least two following observations lead to an affirmative answer to this query:

... ..vernacular elite in India as a whole are internally divided on the issue of the 'link' language. On the one hand, the Hindi-speaking elite, which is by and large monolingual and in effect operates with one-language formula, wants Hindi to be the only 'link language' at national level. The non-Hindi vernacular elite, on the other hand, although working assiduously towards reducing the pre-eminence of English in their own respective regions, wants to retain English as the only 'link language'; they are loath to concede any ground to Hindi at the national level—not even as second link language, after English. Such a situation of intra-elite conflict among the vernaculars prevents those who want to downgrade the use of English at the regional levels from aggregating at the national level. In the meanwhile the metropolitan elite, for whom English has become virtually their first language, has been able to muster support in favour of English vastly disproportionate to its minuscule numerical strength. (Sheth: 291-92).

Replace the word 'link' with 'official' and this perceptive formulation of D.L. Sheth might give an idea about the complex contradiction the non-English elite embroiled in, though a tale containing certain politics of English practiced and articulated by regional elite including Hindi ones is still there to be told in its full details. Benedict Anderson, on the other hand, provides a clue why the Union bureaucracy did not work on lines expected by the constitution:

Indonesia ... was the only substantial colony in the world that was basically administered in an Asian language. The founders of the colony, the East India Company in the 17th century, were thoroughly cost effective in their thinking, and they had no interest whatever in spending the money needed to train a Dutch language bureaucracy— besides many of their employees were Germans, Swedes, Scots ... They picked up the archipelagic pidgin Malay, Romanised it, kept it simple grammar, and used it as the key administrative language. Right into the twentieth century bureaucrats were discouraged from learning Dutch. (Anderson:1988 in Laitin).

British colonial masters, after their initial romance with local cultures and languages was over,³⁸ took a position radically different from their Dutch counterparts and under the influence of the notorious Macaulay minutes decided to teach English to their Indian employees. But this rare quotation of Anderson raises another unresolved query as to why the a certain English education became the vector of anti-colonialism for only one segment of a class from which the bureaucratic elite was also drawn?

As an extension of this riddle two more questions come to fore: First, why the government of Nehru allowed the double subversion of the constitution? After all Nehru, a known critic of *tatsam* Hindi, was a first hand witness of the role played by Raghuveera in the constituent assembly and in the translation of the draft-document. It would be fare to suppose that Nehru was in full knowledge of the pressure mounted by Raghuveera for keeping Hindustani supporters away from the translation committee. Why did a government, that boasted a secular prime minister and an education minister like Abul Kalam Azad, choose Raghuveera, to whom language was a issue of ‘religion and culture’, to head the project of *paribhasik shabdavali*? It will go in the history of contemporary India that Raghuveera performed his creative disaster under the thumb of Nehru because three hundred thousand ‘new technical and scientific’ words³⁹ had already been heaped on Hindi before the fifties could be over. Second, why did leaders like Nehru and Patel in fifties and sixties, and then in late seventies non-Congress leadership of Janta party, with its substantial sprinkling of Hindi-advocates and strong legacy of

³⁸ As early as in 1854, Sir Charles Wood wrote in his minutes on education that imposition of English on Indians never constituted either purpose or desire of British. Instead British always try to establish Indian languages in place of Persian rather than English. Wood was in favour of imparting European knowledge to Indians in their own languages. (Kher: 25).

³⁹ Ramvilas Sharma challenged this claim of coining three hundred thousand new words. In one of his very interesting article (2011:174) he informed us that the work of Sukhsampatti Rai Bhandari published in 1932 should be credited for many of these so called innovations or evolved words. According to Sharma if we count genuinely new words they will not fill more than twenty pages. He mobilised evidence that 99 per cent of so called paribhashik words were already in use before the publication of official dictionary.

Angreji Hatao, never force the Union bureaucracy to abide by the dictates of the constitution? These are not the small issues and will remain unresolved unless investigated separately. The pioneering work on the relationship of Sanskrit and the concept of Indian nationhood done by Sumati Ramaswami, it seems, calls a deeper look. A supplementary investigation might provide a clue as to why instead of being used as a source of enrichment, an instrument of distortion was carved out of a great classical language. Similarly the extent of autonomy enjoyed by the Union bureaucracy during and after Nehru-Patel era has to be looked into especially under the light of language question.

VI

Mapping the Social Sector: ‘Multiplier Effect’ of Hindi

In the absence of a politico-administrative will and due to the pitch forking between old and new slaves of Sanskrit and English, *sarkari* Hindi never became the kind of instrument that could fit the constitutional imagination. The range of the distortions that resulted scarred other segments too, such as education, text-book writing and higher echelon of knowledge-making that usually overlaps with government policy. But, beyond the debilitating norms of *parbhashikta* and government sponsored Hindi-promotions, lay a huge and vibrant realm in which Hindi could not be thwarted. In the late sixties, Baldev Raj Nayar (1968) embarked on a meaningful inquiry to see whether Hindi has a future as an all India link-language outside of the government quarters. He looked for structural conditions upon which development of such a link-language was dependent upon.

He began by analysing the census data of 1961 and attended the issue briefly as to why so many dialects were placed under Hindi. Ultimately he took the claims of mother-tongue at face value and found if 30.4 per cent claimants of Hindi were bolstered by the figures of Urdu and Hindustani, then the size of this speech-community would reach 35.7 per cent. Certainly not a language of more than half of Indians, but in a multilingual setting this Hindi-block was too conspicuous by its largeness to ignore. Nayar tried to look at the dynamics of this size of speech-community in the mirror of market activities: ‘What are

the implications of this huge block of population in terms of the greater usage of Hindi as a link-language? For one thing, it would mean that opportunities of interaction— through merchants, industrialists, labourers, soldiers, religious mendicants, travellers— of other language groups would be greater with Hindi than among non-Hindi groups themselves. There is a sort of ‘multiplier effect’ built into an initial large size of a group, serving to promote its language as the link language. The large population bloc serves as an attractive market for all kinds of goods and services. Those who would want to exploit this market are likely to make some acquaintance with its language.’ Nayar also noted that its perceived lower literary reputation did not prevent the creative writers of other languages from impressing upon Sahitya Academy that their work must be translated in Hindi to allow them take benefit of its large market. ‘It is significant’, Nayar pointed out to an aspect of Hindi never underlined before, ‘that already Hindi has become a clearing house among the different languages in India. If a novel in Malayalam has to translated into Punjabi it would be hard to find a Malayalam-Punjabi translator. The same is true of translations between other languages in the South and the North. But Hindi acts as a bridge language. The novel in Malayalam will first be translated into Hindi, and then into other Indian language. ... If a Bengali who doesn’t know Tamil wants to know something about Tamil poetry, there is no other place for him to go except to Hindi works. Hindi has become the exchange agency among Indian literature.’ Quoting from P. Mahadevan’s book published in 1965 *A Student’s Guide to Anti-Hindi*, Nayar gave the information that in a place like Tamilnadu, hub of anti-Hindi agitation, around thirty to forty hundred thousand people had a working knowledge of this language.

The scenario painted by Nayar was buttressed by his understanding that the existence of Hindi in almost every geographical area of India has resulted from a protracted historical process with no role of state-power in it. The increasing intensity of industrialisation, urbanisation and migration was adding considerably to this multiplier effect. The non-English speaking workers of Orissa’s Rourkela steel plant conversed with each-other in working Hindi irrespective of their ethnic origin, the cosmopolitanism of Bombay was structured around this language, and South Indians staying in Andaman made it their lingua-franca. This expansion of Hindi, according to Nayar, was reflected in the census data of first subsidiary language. Though the specific question was never asked whether

the person knew Hindi, the bilingualism figure of Hindi (2.13 per cent) was only a shade lower than English (2.74 per cent) and after neutralisation of English bilingualism of Hindi-Urdu-Hindustani claimants, Hindi-bilingualism was bound to fare better. Nayar took bilingualism data of the census to task because it grossly under-reported the number of Tamil-Hindi bilinguals as 29,818 whereas, according to the records of Dakshin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, 454,916 people had already appeared in its examinations between 1952 to 1959. He referred to a book-reader survey and informed that among non-Hindi reader's preference for English books is only double compared to Hindi books.

The field of entertainment, in his considered opinion, was propelling Hindi towards the status of link-language. The Madras film industry was looking to tapping Hindi film market and on the basis of popularity enjoyed by Hindi films in South India, he saw film medium as an important teaching mode to add to the knowledge of Hindi there. Besides, Nayar found that more than their visual effect, the musicality of Hindi films was carrying Hindi to the area hitherto unknown to it. Broadcasted by Vividh Bharti and Ceylon Radio, this musicality was a hybrid creature of Indian classical and folk combined with American Jazz and Latino beats. Singing or humming a song of a different language, according to him, is a pro-active cultural effort compared to the passive watching of a movie.

Nayar highlighted another usually silent dimension of Hindi spread and diffusion by describing the world of Hindi Pracharini Sabha's low-profile but relentless enterprise in non-Hindi areas. This voluntary sector, founded by Gandhi in Madras, started its activities from 1918 and by 1956 was able to introduce primary knowledge of Hindi to more than seventy hundred thousand people. The working of these organisations was not dependent upon the activists imported from Hindi belt but by the cadres and leaders drawn mainly from the non-Hindi areas. In 1959 Dakshin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabhas ran 1,350 examination centers for the number as large as 150,000 examinees among which 20 per cent used to appear for higher grades. Even in the anti-Hindi violence of 1937 and then in 1965 this educational movement retained its headquarters in Madras, because not a single event of arson and attack was reported against the properties of Sabhas with DMK leaders clarifying that they do not intend to oppose voluntary

propagation of Hindi. Quoting Paul Friedrich (1962), Nayar claimed that ‘recent testimony from school teachers indicates that Indian children learn Hindi twice as fast as they do English.’ To bolster his argument he referred to Suneeti Kumar Chatterji that learning Hindi does not involve much hardship for a person from South India. Beyond these scholarly views, Nayar came out with a plausible theory that since Dravidian language family did not develop a lingua-franca of its own and Hindi is bound to fill this gap for it later or sooner.

The authenticity of Nayar’s observation, made forty years ago, is enhanced greatly when it is matched with the current scenario. With the substantial jump in literacy and ubiquitous communication revolution, the multiplier effect of Hindi has been increased manifold in its intensity and diffusion. With the colours of media added to it, which Nayar did not talk about for it was not a great social force in those days, the effective mapping of Hindi’s social sector has an astonishingly developing reality about it:

... increasing politicisation of society have made Hindi crucial to the forums, such as Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha and state assemblies, where its presence was used to be overwhelmed by the hegemony of English. As a phenomenon, steadily but surely gathering significance mainly due to the political rise of *shoodra* and *dalit* communities, it has increasingly opened the doors of our legislatures for the ones who like to use Hindi for political discourse. ... Parliamentarians hailing from non-Hindi region are now under the pressure to learn this language. The contours of linguistic change in the electoral setting indicate that HMT (Hindi medium types) people are making their numbers felt among political elite. ... Its membership is no longer the preserve of English-speakers. With newly found confidence and stature, this HMT has perfected a politics of English, a kind of its own, which pushes English hegemony out of focus by the help of governmental decrees and at the same times initiates to inspire oppressed communities to be proficient in English, that means through acquiring formal bilingualism ... With every passing year HMT numbers are increasing in the UPSC entrance exams, writing papers and giving interviews in their own language. The percentage has now reached to one-fourth of the total appearances. Anybody wanting to know where they have come from should have a look at the number of PHD students with Hindi as their linguistic medium in Delhi University, largest bastion of IAS aspirants. For instance, in political science department more than 50 per cent student, inhibited once, now intend to write their dissertation in Hindi only. ... Largeness of this category in fact have made professors and readers anxious about their own resources and teaching skills that are heavily tilted towards the medium of English. Capable translators are in demand to produce John Rawls and Will Kymlicka in Hindi. ... The annual report of the National

Readership Survey repeats the same story every year in the context of circulation growth of Hindi publications ... that English ones are not even competing now. The ratio of readers per newspaper is falling sharply for Hindi, compare to earlier when one newspaper was being consumed by five people, now two among them have become the independent buyers. Among 36 crores, with newly developed reading capabilities but still not touched by newspaper industry, more than two-third is from the sphere of Hindi, a sure combination of prospective readers and prospective consumers. ... Gone are the days when a Hindi journal used to suffer step motherly treatment in a house that boasted English flagship publication. Hierarchy was reversed when two big Hindi houses launched an English newspaper with a serious competitive edge as a complementary business activity. ... As per the figures, in 2006 Hindi journals published advertisements valued at about Rs. 15,000 crore. Since market in big cities is saturated, ad industry has shifted its focus on small towns, rural and semi-urban areas where Hindi Press rules. ... Book publishers in Hindi has seized upon an emerging market for translated works of social sciences that was just not there a few years ago. With a substantial corpus of discursive literature published in last fifty years (complete works of Gandhi, Mao, several works of Marx, Lenin, Gramsci, Lenin, works of Lohia, Jay Prakash, Narendra Dev, thinkers of Sarvodaya movement, etc) at its back, Hindi is now well set to intervene in the field of social sciences. ... This is not to say that Hindi in its boom period is succumbing to the forces of market and profit only, the world of little magazines is thriving more than ever echoing literary-cultural voices(Dubey, 2006)

Neither of the mappings, by Nayar in 1968 and the contours of current scenario depicted above, talks about the outstanding progress Hindi made in literary field, which in effect provided it a strong foundation and launching pad in social sector. In last twenty years or so interventionist writings of women, dalits and Muslims have particularly led the way to reconfigure the issues and debates inside its modernity. Though other Indian languages enjoyed a head-start in terms of literary reputation, Hindi covered the ground with powerful and rapid strides.

To serve the multi-sector world of information, entertainment and consumerism Hindi was bound to usher in several spoken and written forms. The diversification started in early eighties when a new crop of journalists broke away from the dominance of the literary idiom and the independent discipline of news and feature writing blossomed all the way to the explosive popularity of newspapers and magazines. Since then the repertoire of language has been enriched to the extent of allowing newer forms of Hindi co-exist with the established ones. Apart from the aesthetic claims of literary Hindi and

the highly effective language of oral political discourse, we have now a Hindi of news media which itself bifurcates in two kinds that is being deployed by its print and electronic domains. Another Hindi worked its way to Hinglish that mostly being uttered in upstart publications and FM channels. Besides, a discursive idiom of Hindi, that boasts a fine pedigree from the annals of literary criticism, can also be seen as evolving very slowly in the domain of social sciences. The contradiction between constant enlargement of scope and very little time for consolidation has thrown advocates and practitioners of this language in a bit of tizzy. Their unease can be gauged from following series of sharply conflicting statements:

Namvar Singh: ... a Hindi of neo-liberal era that has been in currency for fifteen-twenty years. Marked with the great increase in the numbers of periodicals and newspapers, the structure of language has been getting influenced by media, particularly by TV channels. A kind of *khichri* Hindi is being deployed on this new media with relentless mixing of English words. The language of Daily newspapers has also suffered on this count. Even those English words are thrown in whose popular Hindi equivalents are easily available. It seems that adulteration of various kinds, from the eating habits to the mixed language, emerged as the most serious consequences of globalisation. Even in the stories and poems words of English are being uses. Gone are the days when some protocol of language was in vogue. With no such regulation in effect, one is free to write Hindi according to ones own whims and fancies.

Krishna Kumar: ... Mainly reduced to serve as the language of commerce and advertisement along with the entertainment industry, it is going through a period of disintegration of its vast capabilities. To some extent its creative energies are regenerated to in the domain of literature. But after all literature needs to be bolstered by the original creation of knowledge. It alone can not recover the grounds that have been lost due to the marginalisation of Hindi in the institutional domains of education and knowledge.

Sudheesh Pachauri: The stark reality of today is not to be ignored that as a social process language necessarily relates to the dynamics of economy. This fact has been precipitated more by the current age. In an advertisement China is shown teaching Hindi, and by publishing it 'The Economist' in a sense indulges in the act of teaching the language and underlines for its own sake a particular utilitarian aspect of Hindi. This magazine takes India and China as two powerful economies that have emerged to a certain extent in twenty first century and realises the need of exploring them for its own market. The developing media of Hindi is also a big story of Hindi's developing economy. ... Language moves on the limbs provided to it by economy, culture and literature is adorned on it.

Prabhu Joshi: ... These fifteen years represent a greater genocide of our languages than the history of last one and a half century. To explain it away as a logical consequence, they are making an argument of 'technological fate'. Besides, they are milking Bollywood too. Touted as a language of youth, aesthetic values are being claimed in a language that is full of lumpency. A 'thought of spreading the thoughtlessness', the minds of young generations are tightly stuffed with it. This is another matter that they are heaping same thoughtlessness on our country as a whole.

Uday Prakash: Due to the relentless increase of alien words in Hindi, the issue of creolisation was raised with great fan-fare. It was meaningless. ...Hindi being used today has no single structure. ... Flattening of this diversity is not possible. Undemocratic as well as regressive for various reasons, this will go against the interests of Hindi that is developing on day to day basis. ... The emerging culture of Unicode and mobile-net has put Hindi increasingly beyond the limits of script. A necessary development, then only Hindi would be able to breathe in modern world.

Priyadarshan: ... They are serving a kind of English under the pretext of using Hindi, will make them only more loyal to English. Sooner or later the readers of these newspapers are going to realise that they will be better served by English newspapers because the same translatorial language and reading material is made available to them in original by them with far more professional finesse. That is to say, these Hindi newspapers are preparing a readership for tomorrow's English newspapers.⁴⁰

From the senior public intellectual Namvar Singh to the likes of young author Priyadarshan, the tremendous spread and wide diffusion of Hindi is causing discomfort, but there are respectable voices like Uday Prakash and Sudheesh Pachauri who are in welcome mode. Generally speaking, one finds a strange sense of gloom among Hindi literati, perhaps because the sudden onslaught of market forces has made their linguistic selves insecure which they cultivated over the generations. They feel helpless in a world where concerns, priorities, cultural demands and future projections are not the same as twenty-thirty years ago when they felt safely anchored in the ideologies of nineteenth century.

In a Non-Hindi Mirror: Interestingly this developing social sector has processed an image of Hindi, which is about its regions too, in the minds of non-Hindi realm of national life. I have presented below two sketches, at best subjective, but important and

⁴⁰ Articles of Namwar Singh, Prabhu Joshi, Krishna Kumar and Sudheesh Pachauri appeared in Hindi Dival Special issue of Dainik Bhaskar. Uday Prakash's piece published in the next day issue of the same news paper. Jansatta of September 14, 2011 carried the anguish of Priyadarshan.

meaningful because after all, as we have seen above, during sixties these sectors did not oppose Hindi on the basis of any objective criteria.

The **first image** emanated from a large symposium organised in 2005 by a Hindi newspaper published from a non-Hindi area in which no less than 48 prominent non-Hindi intellectuals participated. (Lokmat Samachar: 2005). Not an ordinary sample by any stretch of imagination because this group of non-Hindi elite contained names of famous creative writers, journalists, social scientists, professors, social activists, artists and film makers. Likes of Chandrakant Bandivdekar, Anand Teltumbde, Suvas Deepak, Namdev Dhasal, Vitthal Bagh, V.S. Jog, Sujana Devi Acharya, Ashok R. Kelkar, Kumar Ketkar, Rohini Hatangadi, Y.D. Pharke, Neelu Phule, Satyaranjan Sathe, Ashok Kamat, Anand Modak, Devdatta, Nagappa, Keshav Rav Jadhava, Shanta Sinha, M.T. Khan, Vinay Verma, Vijay Raghav Reddy, A. Arvindakshan, Chiranjeev Singh, Pratibha Rai, Bhaskar L. Bhole, Suravaram Sudhakar Reddy, Gopi Anyadi, Som Bandopadhyay, Mahashveta Devi, Mrinal Sen, Balshauri Reddy, Dharmpal, Navarun Bhattacharya, Chandrashekhar Dharmadhikari, Jaspal Singh Siddhu, Ram Narain Kumar, Pamela Philippose, G. Gopinath, John Dayal, Uma Chakravarty, K. Sachchidanandan, Chandrakanta, U.R. Anantmurti, Chandrashekhar, Mohan Guruswami, Francis Debrito and Jyoti Lanjewar have not only expressed their views on Hindi and Hindi region but gave a comparative perspective with non-Hindi languages and regions.

Marathi-speaking dalit intellectuals underlined a distinction with Hindi speech-community that Ambedkarism and its politics made inroads in it but not the anti-Hindu message of Babasaheb. Besides, North Indian Hindus are unlike their South Indian counterparts for they are not worried about the inter-religious identities like Shaiva, Vaishnava and Shakta; comparably less amenable to the practices of ritual purification ('for them *go-mootra* holds no power of cleansing'). This observation reveals why, unlike its Marathi counterpart, dalit literary sphere in Hindi has not gone through the separatist trend and merges smoothly with mainstream. A number of Marathi and South Indian intellectuals remarked that since *Hindi-samaj* is imbued with less provincialism it is able to spread all over India and at places carved out entirely new world out of nothing (*shoonya se nayee shrishti*). Non-Hindi intellectuals generally talked about communal

politics of North, but did not fail to recognise strong anti-communal traits in which Hindu-Muslim amity plays significant social role. They criticised Hindi region for not going through radical social reform movements like the ones happened in south of Vindhya, but at the same time conceded that Hindi belt is suffused with democratic politicisation. In other words, this observation indicates the different origins from which socio-cultural modernisation in north must have begun. Non-Hindi intellectuals maintained that as a constituent of modernity Hindi area is ahead in terms of the development of visual and print media. They also identified a particular trend which facilitates constant inflow of people and their migration to other areas of country. As a result, the Hindi people show a cultural flexibility not available with other speech-communities. The deep impact of social modernisation is felt if one goes through the discussions and debates published in Hindi magazines on the topics like divorce, extramarital relationship, dating with girl/boy friend. The problematic relationship with Urdu and its history was pointed out but mentioned along with it the gradual making of greater Hindi community resulting in the dilution of contradiction.

It was important to note that out of 48 participants of the symposium not even one mentioned anti-Hindi politics of south. Either the forces of time or its increasing irrelevance must have caused this erasure. In stead, it was recalled that first school to teach Hindi in Madras state was opened at the residence of Periyar Ramaswamy Naicker, and during anti-Hindi violence of sixties the offices of Dakshin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha remained untouched by angry Tamil youths. Also mentioned was the piece of history where Malayalam speech-community welcomed Hindi with open arms in early twentieth century. More than one non-Hindi intellectual underlined the fact that the one who knows Hindi can not lose one's way in Chennai. There were many criticisms of Hindi and its region with the differentiation of Hindi and non-Hindi modernities, but a consensus seemed to emerge from the discussion that only Hindi is capable of developing as an all-India link-language, ostensibly akin to having an Indian-ness. While betraying the tendency of mixing up official/national, non-Hindi intellectuals conceded that on this count they have no alternative to Hindi. The creative writers and film makers recognised the fact their cultural products are embraced through adaptations or translations by the huge market of Hindi with a kind of readiness usually not shown by other linguistic

communities. They kept emphasising that only Hindi can stop English in its tracks but it need to imbibe more pan-Indian and inter-cultural elements.

Having articulated the positive aspects, the discussion did not let Hindi escape from criticism that it failed to come true to its tag of official language of the Union or for that matter unofficial status of being a national language. The unilingual attitude of Hindi-speech community was attacked relentlessly with the comment that *Hindi-samaj* does not want to learn any language other than English. The Hindi-people were forced to recall the history that but for the advocacy of non-Hindi stalwarts, this language wouldn't have become a prominent anti-colonial cultural tool. The critique gets concretised in a message: '*Hindi-samaj* suffers from a misconception that numbers make nations. In democracy majority of opinion works, not the numerical majority.' Without recalling the anti-Hindi movement, its main demand was articulated through a representative statement was: 'Hindi should not be imposed on anybody. Its expansionist pressure group will not work at all.'

The **second image** pertains to a Sunday magazine issue of *The Indian Express* that carries the cover story 'Symbols of Swaraj' in which through a pictorial and textual depiction figured 27 items: The date of 15 August, The Red Fort, Jan-Gan-Man, Teen Murti Bhavan, Vande Mataram, Parliament House, 'Gandhi' of Attenborough, National Flag, the first Indian flag unruffled by Madam Cama, Khadi, Gandhi Cap, Ambedkar Museum, Khushwant Singh's 'Train to Pakistan', the Naveen Jindal initiative that allows private citizens to fly national flag, Nehru's midnight speech, The Emblem of India, The New York Parade, Rushdie's 'Midnight Children', Wagah border, Ketan Mehtas 'The Rising: Ballad of Mangal Pandey', India Gate/Rashtrapati Bhavan, Independence Cup, Kite-flying, Bhagat Singh Memorial, Museum of Indian Independence, August Kranti Maidan and Gateway of India. Though Hindi did not figure among these symbols and at least two English novels make the list, interestingly before the opening of the cover story, magazine chose to print a two page feature titled 'Chennai Says it in Hindi' about the city 'once bitterly opposed to the northerner's tongue'. At the entrée point of my enquiry I have already quoted a few lines out of a collage constructed from it:

They flutter (*dohas* of Kabir pinned on the green felt-board) in evening breeze as Swati talks about her passion for a language far removed from her native tongue Tamil. It all started with the snatches of Hindi news over-heard from her neighbour's radio. 'It sounded so elegant,' says Swati, pausing to rummage for the Hindi word 'elegant'. 'I knew I had to learn to speak and write like that.' ... But Swati's mother, Ananya, takes a broader view, 'I have lived in Mumbai for two years. Hindi is necessary if you want to move to other states. People living in south India are increasingly aware of this,' says the 44-year old, who watches Star Plus and Zee TV to help polish her Hindi. 'We enjoy watching Hindi stand-up comedy—there is no equivalent of this on Tamil TV,' she says. ... S. Duraiswamy, a retired executive says ... 'There are two sets of people in Chennai today. Those who go out their way to introduce new ways of asserting the Tamil spirit; and the middle and upper-middle classes who wants to learn Hindi and to make sure their children don't miss the Hindi bus.' ... the Dakshin Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha, an institution that dates back to the pre-independence era. The Sabha has now 18,000 certified pracharaks in Chennai alone, 6,000 of whom actively teach. ... In February 2011, about 50,000 people in Tamilnadu—thirteen thousand from Chennai alone—appeared for the prathamik-level sabha examination, with over 95 per cent passing. ... Kevin and Manova Jacob, who are studying for the Sabha's Hindi Parichaya exam at Balkrishnan's academy, agree, 'It is important to know the national language,' says Kevin. ... They can't speak fluent Hindi yet but hope to be able to preach the Bible in Hindi one day. ... 'I have always said, Mr. Karunanidhi would have been the prime minister long ago if only he has known Hindi. His daughter does, though. She was a Sabha Student,' says C.N.V. Annamalai in faultless Hindi. 'There is a lot of demand for Hindi in south India. In a year, six lakh people from the four southern states appear for Sabha exams,' he says adding, 'Studying Hindi does not mean ignoring Tamil.' ... 'There is Hindi teacher in every apartment complex in Chennai, seriously.' Balkrishnan laughs and nods, 'Theruvellum Hindi muzhakkam (the cries of Hindi in every street),' he jokes. ... 'Knowledge of Hindi is no longer an unimportant qualification in the job market,' says Anoop S., a senior manager with a pharmaceutical company in Chennai. 'Yes, English is the first language of Industry, but what if you are posted in Lucknow?,' says Anoop, who have hired a private tutor for three months last year. (Shobha: 2011)

Two years ago Hindi could be studied as an optional subject in Tamilnadu, but under the new system of *Samacheer Kalvi* (uniform education act) that integrated state and matriculation boards, one can choose from Arabic, Urdu, Malayalam, Sanskrit, French and various Indian and foreign language as third language but not Hindi. Hindi, on the one hand, is suffering from the negative planning of the state, but on the other hand, it is making deeper inroads, better than at any other time in its history, in the Tamil-speech community through voluntary efforts of Hindi-*prachar* and on the basis of demand

generated by market forces, a phenomenon called by Nayar in late sixties ‘the multiplier effect of Hindi’.

V

Link-Language: The Competitive Trajectories of Two Bilingualisms

So far, I have tried to narrate two tales, one about the theory and practice of a unique project that was, and, I suppose, still is about making of a multilingual nation-state, and the other one related to the chequered history of a language called Hindi by telling two parallel stories of its development, in two sectors, that is *sarkari* and the social. But a puzzle is yet to be solved whether the social sector boom of Hindi or for that matter the many-fold increase in its ‘multiplier effect’ is taking it any where near the status of a true lingua-franca of the Indian people as against English, the already established link-language of urban elite? It is necessary to answer this question, even if in somewhat tentative manner, because if India is not looking up to a link-language of indigenous origin, than English will, probably in a distant future, become the lingua-franca of this multilingual land.

In the context of South Asia and India, Tej K. Bhatia claims in *The Hand-Book of Bilingualism* that ‘Hindi provides a major contact language link within the communicative network. The heart of this link consists in the Hindi-Hindustani-Urdu-Punjabi core/axis. This axis forms a giant speech-community with direct links to Bengali in the east, Gujarati and Marathi in the West, and Telugu and Kannada in the south.’ (Bhatia 2009:791). The link-language status of Hindi becomes all the more significant when we find that major language families of India, particularly the Dravidian one, have not developed their own link-language. Since bilingualism appears in various ways and forms several equations in a multilingual setting, the quality and main tendency of this widely spread Hindi-bilingualism ought to be underlined. Not a consequence of any government induced planning, according to Bhatia, the bilingualism of India or South Asia is ‘shaped primarily by the natural forces of networking and communication (e.g. media, trade, multiple identities, etc.)’. Not only Bhatia, who have done substantial work

on India's bilingualism, but a number of other scholars has also concluded that contrary to the European and American experience, Indian bilingualism does not belong to a type that is known as language-shift but to the type of language-maintenance. It has been observed that a 'second generation speaker in Europe and America gives up his native language in favour of the dominant language of the region; language-shift is the norm and language-maintenance an exception. In India language-maintenance is the norm and shift an exception. (Pandit: 1977). Mainly due to the strong prevalence of the language-maintenance tendency, the all-India presence of a language or tongue can only be understood in terms of a language that links various speech-communities, though idiomatically or as metaphor for nation-state many people might call it national language or *rashtra-bhasha*. We have already seen in the initial sections of this paper that how wonderfully the crux of this idea has been seized upon by the language provisions of the constitution.

In the absence of any other reliable source of data I have focussed mainly on the figures of bilingualism provided by decennial census of India, all the while keeping in the mind the obvious limitations of this information.⁴¹ Before I embark upon data presentation and analysis, another observation about the imperatives of learning a language is in order. Forty years ago Mahadeo L. Apte (1970) made an attempt to understand the factors that influence a person's decision about choosing to learn a second language. He zeroed in on two domains: the structural similarity or difference between two or more languages, and the socio-linguistic aspects which include the functional values of all languages in a multilingual nation in relation to the socio-cultural, political, and economic factors. Regarding the first domain, referring to a number of linguists Apte concluded that many structural features are shared not only by the languages of one family but also by languages of other families. In terms of lexical similarities, number of words from Sanskrit or Persian sources can be found in every Indian language. He said that higher the level and formality of discourse in each language, the greater the similarity of words; therefore it is plausible to argue that the degree of structural and lexical similarity among major Indian languages is fairly high. In contrast, the degree of similarity between English and any Indian language is low. But in the second domain, Apte had no doubt

⁴¹ Nayar (1968) and bhatia (2009) has made some critical remarks on the politics of Census data regarding languages.

that in terms of functional value English scores over every other Indian language. Due to the social prestige, market opportunities and cultural neutrality attached with it, an attitude heavily tilted towards English has been imbibed across the land. After an elaborate exercise of finding about the extent of interlingual communication in India, Apte reached to a point where he compared the status of two link-languages, Hindi and English, which he found genuinely present across the nation. He observed significantly, ‘... the extra-linguistic factors seem to weigh heavily against the favourable situation of structural and lexical similarity between Hindi and other Indian languages. There is reason to believe, that although the degree of inter-linguistic communication between major languages and Hindi is likely to increase with the growth of literacy, the persistent attitude described above will either tend to ignore or deny the existence of such a development.’

Let alone the period in which Apte was making his inquiry, I find the persistence of this pro-English attitude in the current crop of social science literature as well. Paul Brass (2009), while constructing a table of bilingualism on the basis of the census figures of 1991, more or less ignores the factors that come into play with the growth of literacy. Obviously when a social scientist refuses to consider such ostensible sociological evidence, he makes himself prone to ignore other equally important indicators such as the rapid rate of industrialisation, high incidence of inter-provincial migration, increasing influence of print and audio-visual media and an entirely different protocol of life-chances provided by the ever-expanding market. That is precisely why Brass does not see the multiplier effect of Hindi working in any manner on the competing trajectories of Hindi and English bilingualism. Let’s see how he reads the **Table-1** which tells us about the figures of bilinguals from 1991 census. The speech-communities of northern and western India, according to Brass, give primacy to Hindi for their bilingualism, but the speech communities of southern and eastern India are in favour of English. Therefore, he concludes that India is bifurcated in two parts as far as the bilingualism is concerned and then gives the judgement that the South and the North-east have rejected Hindi as a cultural language. It is difficult to understand the meaning of cultural here, because the whole edifice of his argument is based on the idea of life-chances provided by market, employment opportunities and easy mobility.

Table-1
Percentage of Hindi and English Bilingualism in 1991 Census

Sr. No.	Language	Hindi %	English %
1	Assamese	16.93	14.22
2	Bengali	6.64	9.04
3	Gujarati	23.91	10.60
4	Hindi	N.A.	8.85
5	Kannada	8.97	11.98
6	Kashmiri	N.A.	N.A.
7	Konkani	25.04	34.85
8	Maithili	N.A.	N.A.
9	Malayalam	19.07	24.35
10	Manipuri	24.31	26.27
11	Marathi	25.79	12.10
12	Oriya	11.37	12.66
13	Punjabi	36.25	23.72
14	Santhali	N.A.	N.A.
15	Sindhi	50.65	19.45
16	Tamil	1.56	14.05
17	Telugu	8.01	11.10
18	Urdu	20.61	7.86

Nevertheless, I can suggest another way of looking at this table, which I suppose is more transparent and nuanced. The prevalence of Hindi-bilingualism is far ahead of its English counterpart among Sindhi, Punjabi, Marathi, Gujarati and Urdu speech-communities, with the difference between the two being as much as double or even more than it. In terms of Assamese, the second largest speech-community of the Eastern India after Bengali, Hindi-bilingualism has a small but definite edge of 2.71 per cent over English. Among Manipuri and Oriya speakers English is only marginally (1.96 % and 1.26 %) ahead. In the zone of South, English-bilingualism is certainly more prevalent and Hindi-bilingualism, particularly among Tamil-speakers, is a meagre 1.56 per cent. But in the rest of the southern zone the condition of Hindi bilingualism is not that bad. Advocates of Hindi are in for a pleasant surprise when in the hundred per cent literate Malayalam speech-community Hindi-bilingualism figures 19.07 per cent against English-bilingualism of 24.35 per cent. Similarly, For Kannada and Telugu the balance is tilted in the favour of English with only three per cent each. In Bengal, another typical non-Hindi area, English has a better presence but is ahead only by 2.40 per cent.

When I compare these figures with the bilingualism shown by the census of 1961 (Table-2), the simplification resorted to by Paul Brass becomes meaningless. Among the Dravidian speech-communities only Malayalam showed a negligible figure of .48 per cent Hindi-bilingualism whereas among Tamils, Telugus and Kannadigas reporting of Hindi was completely absent. The comparison with the 1991 figures tells us that Hindi-bilingualism not only appeared in all these four non-Hindi areas, but also made significant gains to compete with English-bilingualism except in Tamilnadu. The data also shows that in the thirty year time-span Bengalis have experienced a much higher degree of bilingualism with English-bilingualism increasing to almost two-fold while Hindi-bilingualism increased more than three times since then. In Assam the bilingualism-equation has been upturned where the prevalence of Hindi (2.21/16.93) has bested that of English (2.33/14.22).

Table-2: Percentage of Hindi and English bilingualisms in the Census of 1961

Sr. No.	Language	Total Speaker	Hindi	%	English	%
1	Assamese	6803463	150326	2.21	158481	2.33
2	Bengali	33754408	614874	1.82	1563076	4.63
3	Gujarati	20105846	773919	3.85	424188	2.11
4	Hindi	123025489			3315038	2.70
5	Kannada	17305629	N.A.		N.A.	
6	Kashmiri	1914446	15018	0.78	8275	0.43
7	Konkani	1337134	N.A.	N.A.	92260	6.90
8	Maithili	4984811	134784	2.70	44769	0.90
9	Malayalam	16944919	80667	0.48	762334	4.50
10	Manipuri	621244	18388	2.96	20610	3.32
11	Marathi	32767442	2017764	6.16	527655	1.61
12	Oriya	15610736	252328	1.62	209175	1.34
13	Punjabi	9868279	725602	7.35	406955	4.12
14	Santhali	3130829	228932	7.31	N.A.	
15	Sindhi	977023	218826	22.40	86695	8.87
16	Tamil	30465442	N.A.		1261762	4.14
17	Telugu	37642439	N.A.		855030	2.27
18	Urdu	23323047	1021001	4.38	N.A.	

To understand this competitive trajectory of these two all-India bilingualisms, the ten years period, from 1991 to 2001, must be considered meaningful due to its intrinsic

relationship with the process of globalisation. As an international language English might be encroaching upon the areas of influence belonging to the long established European speech-communities like French, German and Spanish. But, as against the general tendency of assuming that the enormous expansion of market oriented opportunities will create conditions favourable to English-bilingualism in India, I am not able to find matching empirical evidence in census data.

Table-3: Hindi and English bilingualisms in 2001 Census


Sr. No.	Language	Total Speaker	Hindi Ist	Hindi 2nd	Hindi %	English Ist	English 2nd	English %
1	Assamese	13168484	11.13	8.90	20.03	10.68	4.22	14.90
2	Bengali	83369769	6.04	4.02	10.06	11.09	1.92	13.01
3	Bodo	1350478	3.15	9.37	12.52	3.54	3.87	7.41
4	Dogri	2282589	50.62	4.69	55.31	4.75	20.42	25.17
5	Gujarati	46091617	32.40	2.22	34.62	2.22	10.68	12.90
6	Hindi	422048642				7.68	0.62	8.30
7	Kannada	37924011	5.81	6.77	12.58	9.82	3.22	13.04
8	Kashmiri	5527698	3.23	1.19	4.42	3.86	2.10	5.96
9	Konkani	2489015	8.75	20.81	29.56	19.86	11.81	31.67
10	Maithili	12179122	31.92	0.56	32.48	0.71	8.24	8.95
11	Malayalam	33066392	3.12	12.18	15.30	21.24	2.62	23.86
12	Manipuri	1466705	7.81	14.55	22.36	27.67	4.78	32.45
13	Marathi	71936894	35.93	2.63	38.56	2.22	12.00	14.22
14	Nepali	2871749	30.27	11.39	41.66	7.35	1.15	8.50
15	Oriya	33017446	8.05	8.74	16.79	15.32	3.54	18.86
16	Punjabi	29102477	41.94	7.99	49.93	9.31	22.82	32.13
17	Sanskrit	14135	51.33	9.81	61.14	6.66	15.97	22.63
18	Santhali	6469600	16.64	1.97	18.61	0.60	2.91	3.51
19	Sindhi	2535485	45.58	6.55	52.13	6.22	14.74	20.96
20	Tamil	60793814	1.14	0.92	2.06	14.88	1.10	15.98
21	Telugu	74002856	5.37	5.84	11.21	10.48	3.65	14.13
22	Urdu	51536111	25.45	6.33	31.78	3.79	5.81	9.60

In Table-3 various speech-communities are shown having first and second choice for Hindi and English for their subsidiary languages with the percentage derived from the gross figures of language-speakers rather than from the gross figures of bilinguals.

However, it also gives an idea of changes that took place happened in the levels of bilingualisms. Though contrary to the fear of many, in southern and eastern zone Hindi-bilingualism has not gone down and maintains its presence. Among Assamese-speakers Hindi-bilingualism is still ahead, and in Bengal the difference between two bilingualisms has become narrower. The increased reputation of English due to the globalisation has

not made any dent in whatever little presence Hindi had in Tamilnadu. English-bilingualism is only marginally ahead among Kannada-speech community whereas in Telugu and Malayalam, Hindi-bilingualism has kept up its competitive edge. In the Oriya region strengths of both bilingualisms are almost identical. The influence of globalisation has not improved the position of English-bilingualism in any of the strongholds of Hindi-bilingualism such as Marathi, Gujarati, Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Nepali, Maithili and Dogri. The changeover between two bilingualisms in this crucial ten year period is shown in the Graph-2, and the


Graph-2: Change over from 1991 to 2001



same competitive trajectory is plotted for the longer time-line data of thirty years (1961 to 1991) in the Graph-2. This data-analysis can be fine tuned a bit if the status of English-bilinguals of Hindi, Hindustani and Urdu is reconfigured. In fact, their numbers can be

neutralised and a third graph can be plotted to give us a more accurate picture, because Hindi and Urdu being their first languages, these speakers can not be deemed participating in this competition of bilingualism from the side of English. An additional tuning of data can be introduced about the subsidiary language preference of those who reported English as their mother-tongue, but census probably does not tell us about their bilingualism.

Graph-1: Change over from 1961 to 1991



Despite the imperfectness of census data, a solid and incontrovertible trend is revealed by these tables and graphs that at the all-India level the status of Hindi as a widely spread link-language has got increasingly firmed-up over the years.

Four Anxieties of the Hindi-literati: Strange it may be sound, but the sterling scene of Hindi propelled by its growth in social sector has yet to infuse a sense of satisfaction and achievement among Hindi-literati. Though almost everybody has more or less benefited,

at personal level, by the opening up of the Hindi sphere, they generally look at the proliferation of various Hindis and their shaping up by the non-literary forces of media and market with suspicion as if a conspiracy is being hatched by global forces of new modernity against their beloved language. Observing the trend carefully over the years I have marked four basic arguments that are advanced by these people—even allowing for specific idiosyncrasies.

Identity politics, according to the first anxiety, unleashed by modernisation is adversely affecting the chances of Hindi as the primary language of the nation. Focussing on the politics of eighth schedule of the constitution whose doors are being knocked at by number of *janpadeeya bhashas* of Hindi region, this argument bases itself upon the premonition that this process, if it snowballs, would take away from Hindi the benefit of numbers. With a Maithili already having entered in the schedule as a separate language and similar claims of Bhojpuri and Awadhi pressing for it, it is feared that one day decennial census will not return Hindi speech-community as the largest one. The damage caused by this negative process could be like a double jeopardy for Hindi as well as for the secessionist *janpadeeya bhashas* because neither of them will remain competitive against the dominance of English, with Hindi suffering from the reduced political leverage and secessionist languages by confining them in their narrow geographical boundaries. I consider this anxiety a superfluous one because it flows from the intellectual tendency of looking at Hindi in the mirror of a single sector discourse in which the constitutional status of language becomes so important that it overshadows its enormous development in social sector. It is Hindi as the fast emerging link-language and not the official language of the Union leading its way.

The second anxiety, the flip side of majoritarian one discussed above, is a sure result of the ‘one language-one nation’ idea having its invisible imprint on the perceptions of these literati. They want to assess the quality of the spread and diffusion of this language in their own image and therefore want to see non-Hindi people speaking and writing in a manner possible only by acquiring it through formal processes. The informal knowledge of Hindi acquired through cultural interactions of audio-visual kind does not seem to put them at ease. Interestingly this kind of demand is never raised concretely, but is nurtured

by the secret desire of having a cultural hegemony based on the diaglossical equation of Hindi vis-à-vis other Indian languages, a relationship currently enjoyed by English.

The third concern is known as *khichrikaran*, an outcome of a natural process every language goes through more than once at different points of its development cycles. When a language interacts with other linguistic media under the informal pressures of various socio-economic situations, these worries usually come to fore due to the unmediated and unregulated nature of that mixing. A section of Hindi literati likes to call it Creolisation, which, in fact, is not commensurate with the history of making of the Creole languages. The idea of linguistic imperialism is also invoked in this context and even respected names like Joshua Fishman are thrown in the fray in a negative sense to prove the point that linguists of the first world are working hand in glove with the forces of international finance capital to accomplish a slow process of linguistic genocide, a serious charge indeed that remains unsubstantiated to the date.⁴² However, mainly provoked by the advent of Hinglish, the idea of *Khichrikaran* has been deployed by two kinds of people: by those who feel duty-bound to protect the ‘purity’ of the language as well as by those who are seriously engaged in knowing about the consequence of this process that has accelerated after the new media have made its presence felt on the spoken as well as on the written forms of Hindi.

The second type of thinking considers that a living language tests its digestive power and limits of assimilation by fearlessly participating in *khichrikaran* with the case of English as a readymade positive instance to bolster their argument. But while arguing their case in right spirit, these people sometimes ignore the diaglossic conditions under which English has been interacting with various non-European languages. *Khichrikaran* with a dominant language as other party can work both ways: it can stunt the growth of those languages that are existing predominantly in spoken form, but if a language has already been tempered through a long process of standardisation to meet the various needs of modern discourse, if it can claim a legitimate literary tradition and a rich literary corpus, if it has already entered in universities as the medium of higher instruction and if there

⁴² It seems that a certain conspiracy theory is working overtime these days that western powers, particularly the English ones, are trying to manage a gradual soft-killing of Indian languages with Joshua Fishman as their master theoretician. They are using same mechanism that was used in the continent of Africa to replace local languages with English. Prabhu Joshi, among Hindi intellectuals, are the main proponent of this theory. In many of his passionate articles he dubbed this process as Creolisation.

are enough members of a generation trained in that language in society at large, then it stands to gain enormous benefit from *khichrikaran*. Hindi, without an iota of doubt, fits in later category and will certainly gain from it in its spread and consolidation.

Fourth anxiety, a genuine concern, relates to a kind of Hindi-English diaglossia that compels a sense of inferiority among the people who are not effortless English-bilinguals. (Dubey: 2005). This inferiority filters through qualitatively less employment opportunities, low wages, subordinate status, step-motherly treatment and institutional bias in an open market situation against the ones who are mainly trained through the medium of Hindi. A result of a typical condition received from colonial modernity and assimilated via a particular structure of Indian elite in which persistence of English became the hallmark of differentiation, this diaglossia can be removed only through a very slow process at the end of which Indian elite will decide to adopt Hindi as their own language of prestige, discourse and interaction. We have already seen how the 'English only' Union bureaucracy, one of the defining group of top elite, sabotaged the chances of Hindi as official language, but an emergent recent trend indicates a small possibility the might begin the process of structural correction among them.

Before late sixties the Union administrative services were like a fortress of English in which Indian languages were not allowed to step in, but the official language proposal of 1968 has forced two changes in the situation. The knowledge of 'Hindi or English' became compulsory for the officers and language of eighth schedule became the medium of entrance test for these services. Then, in 1979 the Kothari Commission changed the pattern of Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) that began the avalanche of candidates from Indian language backgrounds into a realm which was hitherto unavailable to them. Kothari, known for his radical recommendation of common schooling, addressed the problem of burgeoning number of aspirants whose medium of instruction in their university education was not English. In his path-breaking report he cited the figures of Delhi University, reputed for sending most numbers of successful candidates to UPSC, which gave honours degree in History (18 %), Economics (12 %) and Political Science (37%) to Hindi medium students. (Kothari:1976). Convinced that this trend is going to increase in near future, he recommended that every candidate who

wants to become member of the Union bureaucracy must have knowledge of the language mentioned in the eighth schedule of the constitution. (Sharma: 2011).

Under the impact of Kothari's recommendations, the UPSC ushered in a kind of social revolution, the implications of which have yet to be adequately looked at. From 1970 to 1978 the percentage of Indian language candidates (IL) had never gone past the figure of 10.1 per cent, but in the first year, that is 1979 when these recommendations got implemented, the number of IL candidates became 1,74,000 among which 703 declared passed. Participation of Indian languages has in fact increased the catchment area of these services enormously, because due to the 'English only' policy in 1950 the number of passed candidates was 240 out of 3,647 aspirants. In next twenty year these figures increased only up to 428 and 11,710. According to a study published in 2009, in the ten years between 1979 to 1988 IL aspirants increased 15.6 per cent, and in the next nine years this percentage reached up to the figure of 41.6. Interestingly among IL candidates in these 29 years, Hindi candidates were 90.1 per cent. In the first decade they were 87.8, in second decade 89.5 and in third decade 93.1 per cent. The percentage of those who chose to write the first paper of entrance exams in IL was 66.7 in the first decade, whereas in the second and third decades this figure reached up to 74.9 and 76.9 per cent respectively. Although, a comparably low percentage among these students gets the call for interview and those who chose IL for giving interview is also similarly low, evidence shows that this percentage is also on increase: from 1987 to 1996 this percentage was 13.3 which went up to 24.3 during 1997-2006. Among the candidates invited for the interview, 32 per cent adopted IL as its medium in 2007, with Hindi again emerged as the overwhelming favourite with 330 candidates out of 450 aspirants. (Thangirala:2007).

This empirical study done by Maruti P. Thangirala confirms three aspects of this change: the IL candidates among civil services aspirants are increasing at a faster rate, among them Hindi candidates are 85 to 90 per cent, and in the process IL candidates have snatched at least one position from every four English medium candidates. Thangirala called them bilinguals from the Hindi area because they possess a certain amount of English knowledge. He has come up with another significant fact that the number of candidates who chose Hindi for Indian language paper is far more than the percentage

shown in the census of 2001 of those who claimed Hindi as their mother-tongue. Against the 41.03 per cent claimants of Hindi as mother-tongue, 76.9 per cent candidate chose to write IL paper in Hindi. Though the success stories of IL candidates with the focus on their modest rural or semi-urban background appear at regular intervals in national news media and the internet is also flooded with inspiring stories of these underdogs, a consolidated empirical study of the extent of their success has not been done yet. According to a broad estimate out of every ten thousand aspirants only one gets selected to become IAS or IPS, therefore it is difficult to determine the IL percentage in this meagre success rate of .00025 per cent. Whatever be the case, the turn of Indian languages in UPSC has certainly provided substantial opportunities to the sons and daughters of poor workers and peasants, rickshaw-pullers, street-vendors and to other have-nots of society.

One wonders whether the increased mixing of these IL officers in the community of 'English only' bureaucracy would ultimately prove a game-changer in the long run. It will be premature to answer it in affirmative because many things depends upon sustaining the present framework of the related policy. The effects of Kothari Commission recommendations were reviewed in 1988-89 by Satish Chandra Committee that favoured the continuance of the same process, and then in 2001 a committee under Yoginder K. Alagh also supported the Kothari spirit. But, suddenly in 2011 from out of no where UPSC has imposed a 200 mark objective type aptitude test on the IL aspirants in which 30 marks are fixed for the compulsory knowledge of English with no weightage given for IL knowledge. Nitish Kumar, Chief Minister of Bihar, decried this changes in syllabus by saying, 'I decry the change in UPSC's CSAT (Prelims) syllabus making English an essential subject.... it will cause injustice to aspirants from the rural areas ... The system of making English an essential subject must be changed it will be an injustice to the candidates from rural areas in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.'⁴³ The knowledge of English used to be judged in earlier syllabus too, but in the second stage only.

It is being felt that by the introduction of C-SAT as the first barrier, the UPSC has undone the level playing field that was gradually firming up and tilted the balance in favour of

⁴³ For the statement of Nitish Kumar see, online edition of *The Hindu*, May 3, 2011.

English medium or urban educated students. Despite the Satish Chandra Committee's assertion that the current preliminary exam is quite effective for screening candidates for the main examination and there is no need to change this pattern, UPSC clearly deviated from these recommendations and on its own introduced the new pattern similar to the management exams. Although commonness between public and private sectors is increasing due to their overlapping, but as the saying goes 'public and private administrations are alike but in all unimportant areas', administrative structures related to them can not be equated with each other.

VI

Conclusion

The language politics that played out during anti-colonial movement and in the making of the constitution was structurally different from the European pattern of 'one language-one nation'. Neither the idea of national language that was processed during the freedom struggle, nor the concept of official language of the Union formulated by post-colonial state of India was ever conceived or implemented as a compulsory proposition.

Multilingualism always got privilege over unilingualism, and accordingly the context of national language was practically at best developed as a linking media that can connect various linguistic cultures across the nation. Similarly the official language of the Union was not an instrument to encroach upon the rights and jurisdictions of the official languages of various states. All this became got theoretically possible due to the inherent and intrinsic multilingualism of the constitutional provisions and the idea of multilingual citizenship inbuilt in it. The eighth schedule of the constitution represented the rights of several languages to compete for the resources of the Indian state. The policies of Indian state proved conducive to the advancement of linguistic diversity which is evident from the fact that instruction is given at primary level in 47 languages, print media exists in 87 languages, radio and other broadcasting in 71 languages, films are made in 13 languages and state level administration is conducted in 13 languages.

The constitution provided a protocol of a language-planning whose centre-piece was the replacement of English from public administration by developing official languages at various levels. The attempted language-planning by the post-colonial Indian state failed at the level of the Union but succeeded up to a great extent in states. The constitution did not touch upon the idea of link-language and neither allowed the Indian state to intervene in this realm. It was left on the historical, social and economic forces to construct a true lingua-franca for this land of enormous multilingualism. Since the Dravidian language family had no linking media of its own, and similarly the languages of eastern part developed no distinct link-language, Hindi came to fore as the central language of a giant speech community that was constituted by Hindi-Hindustani-Urdu-Punjabi axis, with its historical connections reaching to Telugu and Malayalam in the South, to Bengali and Assamese in the East, to Marathi and Gujarati in the West. Precisely for these reasons, Hindi went through two processes of development that overlapped at some places but mostly remained parallel to each other. With its social and official sectors having distinct identities, a double sector discourse has been woven around this language.

The research and reflection in social sciences have generally treated the language issue in a manner that fell short of recognising the uniqueness and complexity inherent in multilingual nation making. When the ruling elite goofed up and committed serious mistakes in the perusing this project, which happened a number of times, they became the butt of a two dimensional criticism from social scientists. On the one hand, the post-colonial state was severely taken to task either for not doing enough to carve out a national language out of Hindi, or looked down upon for its Hindi bias. The state, on the other hand, was not only declared weak, inconsistent and not politically astute enough to deal successfully with the cultural-political issues of our time, but it was also accused of having a secret and unfulfilled desire of having a one language based nation. Social scientists generally have not shown any inclination to make a distinction between the concepts of official and national as a consequence of which the specificities of a double sector discourse of Hindi are lost on them. Even the discourse that belongs to the state project of language-planning was not enquired deeply for its successes and failures. Obviously they hardly made any attempt to assess the development of Hindi in the social sector and its attendant contradictions and paradoxes.

Since the development of Hindi has been historically processed in two sectors, we have to construct its discourse accordingly. Hindi as official language of the Union, and Hindi as all-India link language are not inter-dependent for their existence; neither are they imbricated as the forms of one language. They belong to two different processes and must be studied as such all the while keeping in mind the various points where they overlap. Builders of our constitution perhaps wished to accelerate the development of Hindi as link-language by establishing it first as official language, or may be they were too much of believers in the powers of modern state. However, the trajectory they have determined for Hindi did not prove commensurate to the ground realities of our post-colonial politics. The combined effect of ‘Sanskrit Nationalism’, the systemic sabotage carried out by the Union bureaucracy and a less than strong political will of ruling elite failed to carry the day for the constitutional imagination. But the social processes kept up Hindi’s progress as all-India link language, initially in a halting manner but recently in a tremendous surge. We can not forget the foresightedness of Nayar’s observation:

Several social forces, regardless of any initiative on the part of the Central Government, seem to be working for the greater spread of Hindi as a link-language. The very large size of Hindi-speaking population constitutes an attractive market for a variety of goods and services, and is likely to propel people into a familiarity with the language to order to take advantage of this market. The already existing situation of Hindi as a lingua-franca over a large part of the country, with virtually no competition from any Indian language for such a role, makes it attractive for those who seek opportunity outside their own region. At the same time, the movies and the radio are spreading knowledge of Hindi indirectly, while many voluntary agencies are engaged in a more serious effort. Thus, given a durable political system, knowledge of Hindi is likely to spread in non-Hindi areas and to aid Hindi as more universal lingua-franca. This, however, would be a rather long-term gradual process.

Immediately after writing these futuristic words in 1968, Nayar mentioned the statement of Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam leaders that they are not opposed to Hindi’s voluntary propagation and would like to see forces of history choosing a link-language for India and not the government of the day. The prophecy of Nayar, it seems, is now on the verge of coming true, thanks to the same forces of history which once enabled Dravid leaders to stall the replacement of English by Hindi at the level of Union administration. We can not discount the possibility, how so ever feeble it may look, of softening the resistance by

Tamil elite and the 'English only' bureaucracy from elevating Hindi as the language of inter-provincial administrative communication and higher judiciary. Coming out of the processes of formal education the new generations of Hindi have already made their presence felt in legislatures and administrative services.

Social transformation is a phenomenon that moves along on a very slow dynamics compared to the political change. Accordingly, the dual processes of Hindi's development as all-India link-language and official language are also working their way with varying slowness. The complex politics of Indian modernity, on its part, makes them uncertain and their trajectory spiral. The stone-mill of democracy is constantly grinding the issue and we have to exercise great patience while waiting for a finer outcome. In a high rise building of the metropolis called Chennai lives Swati who has learnt the formula of patience from a couplet of Sant Kabir:

Dheere-dheere re mana, dheere sab kuchch hoye
Mali seenche sau ghara, ritu aaye phal hoye.

References:

1. Austin, Granville, 'Language and the Constitution: The Half-Hearted Compromise', Sarangi, Asha (Edt.), *Language and Politics in India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2009, pages 41-92.
2. Aginhotri, Ramakant and Sanjay Kumar (Edt.), *Bhasha, Boli Aur Samaj: Ek Antah-Samvad*, Deshkal Prakashan, Delhi, 2001.
3. Agrawal, Purushottam and Sanjay Kumar (Edt.), *Hindi Nayee Chaal Mei Dhali: Ek Punarvichar*, Deshkal Prakashan, Delhi, 2000.
4. Alagh, Yoginder K., *Report of the Civil Service Examination Review Committee*, UPSC, 2001
5. Amarnath, Dr. (Edt.), *Hindi Bhasha Ka Samajshastra*, Anand Prakashan, Kolkata, 2006.
6. Amarnath, Dr., 'Hindi Aur Uski Boliyan: Antarsambandh Aur Antarvirodh', Paper presented in a seminar on the theme of 'Bhoomandalikaran Aur Hindi Ki Asmita' at Bharat Bhavan, Bhopal, September 23-24, 2011
7. Apte, Mahadeo L., 'Some Socio-Linguistic Aspects of Interlingual Communication in India', *Anthropological Linguistic*, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 1970, pages 63-82.

8. Bhokta, Naresh Prasad, 'Aupaniveshik Bharat Mein Lok-bhasha Aur Lipiyan', Agnihotri, Ramakant and Sanjay Kumar (Edt.), *Bhasha, Boli Aur Samaj: Ek Antah-Samvad*, Deshkal Prakashan, Delhi, 2001, pages 18-33
9. Brass, Paul, 'Elite Interests, Popular Passions, and Social Power in the Language Politics of India', Sarangi, Asha (Edt.), *Language and Politics in India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2009, pages 183-220.
10. Chatterjee, S.K., *Indo-Aryan and Hindi*, K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1960
11. *Dainik Bhaskar*, National Edition, Delhi, October 13, 2011.
12. *Dainik Bhaskar*, 'Hindi Hain Ham', Special Issue on Hindi Divas, National Edition, Delhi, September 14, 2011.
13. *Dainik Bhaskar*, National Edition, Delhi, September 15, 2011.
14. *Dadlus*, No. 91, Summer Special, 1962.
15. Datt, Jateendra Mohan, 'Linguistic Imperialism of Hindi', Sharma, Suresh Kumar (Edt.), *Language in Contemporary India*, Volume-I, Vista International Publishing House, Delhi, 2006, pages 153-162
16. Dharmaveer, Dr., *Hindi Ki Atma*, Samta Prakashan, Delhi, 1998.
17. Dua, Hans R., 'The National Language and the Ex-colonial Language as Rivals: The Case of India', *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 14, No. 3, The Emergent World Language System, July (1993), pages 293-308.
18. Dubey, Abhay Kumar, 'Angreji Mein Hindi: Bhashai Etahas Ki Ulata Yatra', *VAK*, Second Issue, Vani Prakashan, Delhi, 2008.
19. Dubey, Abhay Kumar, 'Hindi Ka Humiliation', *Alochana*, Rajkamal, Delhi, 2003
20. Dwivedi, Mahaveer Prasad, *Hindi Bhasha Ki Utpatti*, Anang Prakashan, Delhi, 2001
21. Ekbote, Gopal Rao, *Rashtrabhasha Viheen Rashtra*, Tra. Khanderao Kulkarni, M/S Ekbote Brothers, Hyderabad, 1987.
22. Fishman, Joshua A., 'National Languages and Languages of Wider Communication in Developing Nations', *Anthropological Linguistics*, Vol 11, No. 4, April (1969), pages 111-135.
23. Fishman, Joshua A., 'Nationalism and Language Planning in Nineteenth Century Europe and Twentieth Century Asia and Africa', Rubin. J. and B. Jernud (Edt.), *Can Language be Planned?*, EWC Press, Honolulu, 1971.
24. Fishman, Joshua A., 'Language Modernisation and Planning in Comparison With Other Type of National Modernisation and Planning', *Language and Society*, Vol. 2, No. 1, April 1973, pages 23-43
25. Ferguson, Charles A, Jyotirindra Das Gupta and Joshua A. Fishman (Edt.), *Language Problems of Developing Nations*, John Wiley, New York, 1968.
26. Forester, Duncan B., 'The Madras Anti-Hindi Agitation, 1965: Political Protest and its Effects on Language Policy', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 39, Nov. 1-2, 1966, pages 415-436.

27. Gupta, Jyotirindra Das, *Language Conflict and National Development*, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, 1970.
28. Gandhi, M.K., *Thoughts on National Language*, Navjivan Publishing House, Ahemdabad, 1956.
29. Gould, William, 'Congress Radicals and Hindu Militancy: Sampooranand and Putushottamdas Tandon in the Politics of the United Provinces, 1930-1947', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 3, July 2002, pages 619-655.
30. Gupt, Avdresh Mohan, 'Rajbhasha Hindi: Mulyankan Aur Sujhav', Gupt, Avadresh Mohan and Sushila Shrivanti (Edt.), *Penelope Banam Rajbhasha Ka Charkah*, Abhiruchi Prakashan, Delhi, 1997, pages 81-87.
31. *Hindi Adeshon Ka Ke Prayog Sambandhi Sankalan*, Rajbhasha Vibhag, Griha Mantralaya, Bharat Sarkar, Third Edition, 1986.
32. Hardgrave, Robert L., 'The Riots in Tamilnad: Problems and Prospects of India's Language Crisis', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 5, No. 8, August 1965, pages 399-407
33. *Jansatta*, Delhi, September 14, 2011.
34. Kaviraj, Sudipta, 'Writing, Speaking, Being: Language and the Historical Formation of Identities in India', Sarangi, Asha (Edt.), *Language and Politics in India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2009, pages 312-350.
35. Kanth, Vinay, 'Hindi Nirman Aur Rashtra Ki Avadharana', Agrawal, Purushottam and Sanjay Kumar (Edt.), *Hindi Nayee Chaal Mei Dhali: Ek Punarvichar*, Deshkal Prakashan, Delhi, 2000, pages 16-26.
36. Kothari, D.S., *Civil Service Examination: Report of the Committee on Recruitment Policy and Selection Methods*, UPSC, 1976.
37. Kumar, Krishna, 'Hindu Revivalism and Education in North India', *Social Scientist*, Vol. 18. No. 10, October (1990), pages 4-26.
38. Kumar, Krishan, 'Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan', Dubey, Abhay Kumar (Edt.), *Sampradayikta Ke Srot*, Vinay Prakashan, Delhi, 1993
39. Kumarmangalam, S. Mohan, *India's Language Crisis: An Introductory Study*, New Century Book House, Madras, 1965.
40. Kumarmangalam, S. Mohan, 'The Official Language Commission', Sharma, Suresh Kumar (Edt.), *Language in Contemporary India*, Volume-II, Vista International Publishing House, Delhi, 2006, pages 219-230.
41. Laiten, David D., 'Language Games', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 3, April 1988, pages 289-302.
42. Laitin, Davil D. 'Language Policy and Political Strategy in India', *Policy Sciences*, Policy Making in Developing Countries, Vol. 22, No.3-4, 1989, pages 415-136.
43. *Lokmat Samachar*, 'Hindi Samaj: Ahindi Bharat Ki Drishti, Deepavali Issue, Second Part, Nagpur, 2005

44. Mahadevan, P., *A Student's Guide to Anti-Hindi*, Atri Publishers, Madras, 1965.
45. Nayar, Baldev Raj, 'Hindi as Link-Language', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 3, No. 6, February 10 (1968), pages 1225-1234.
46. Nehru, Jawaharlal, 'Our New Needs', 'Languages Grow Through Inter-Action' and 'The Official Languages', Sharma, Suresh Kumar (Edt.), *Language in Contemporary India*, Volume-I & II, Vista International Publishing House, Delhi, 2006.
47. Pool, Jonathan, 'National Development and Language Diversity', Fishman, Joshua A. (Edt.), *Advances in Sociology of Language*, The Hague: Mouton, pages 213-230.
48. Shobha, V., 'Chennai Says it in Hindi', eye: the Sunday Magazine, *The Indian Express*, Delhi, August 14-20 (2011), pages 4-6.
49. Rai, Rishikesh, 'Asmita Banam Vikhandan', Paper presented in a seminar on the theme of 'Bhoomandalikaran Aur Hindi Ki Asmita' at Bharat Bhavan, Bhopal, September 23-24, 2011.
50. Rai, Alok, *Hindi Nationalism*, Tract of Time Series, Panguin, Delhi, 2001.
51. Romen S., 'Language Policy in Multilingual Context', May, Jacob (Edt.), *Concise Encyclopaedia of Pragmatics*, Elsevier, Oxford, Second Edition, 2009, pages 466-479.
52. Robinson, Francis, *Muslim Separatism in North India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1990.
53. Rao, V.K.R.V., 'Many Languages, One Nation: Quest for an All-India Language'. *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 13, No. 25, January 24 (1978), pages 1025-1030.
54. Ram, Mohan, *Hindi Against India: The Meaning of DMK*, Rachana Prakashan, New Delhi, 1968
55. Raghuvveera, Dr., *Hindi Ki Urja*, Tras. Ramchandra Sharma, Bhagwati Prakashan, Delhi, 1998.
56. Ramswami, Sumati, 'Sanskrit for the Nation', Sarangi, Asha (Edt.), *Language and Politics in India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2009, pages 93-138.
57. Shrivastav, Ravindra Nath, 'Bhasha Aur Samajik Asmita', Amarnath, Dr. (Edt.), *Hindi Bhasha Ka Samajshastra*, Anand Prakashan, Kolkata, 2006, pages 34-45.
58. Sharma, Suresh Kumar (Edt.), *Language in Contemporary India*, Volume-I & II, Vista International Publishing House, Delhi, 2006.
59. Sharma, Ramvilas, *Bharat Ki Bhasha Samasya*, Rajkamal Prakashan, Delhi, Third Edition, Second Reprint, 2011
60. Sharma, Ramvilas, *Bhasha Aur Samaj*, Rajkamal Prakashan, Delhi, Fifth Edition, First Reprint, 2010.
61. Sharma, Ramvilas, *Bharat Ke Pracheen Bhasha Parivar Aur Hindi*, Three Volumes, Rajkamal Prakashan, Delhi, 1976.
62. Sharma, Ramvilas, 'The Question of an Obligatory State Language in India', Sharma, Suresh Kumar (Edt.), *Language in Contemporary India*, Volume- I, Vista International Publishing House, Delhi, 2006, pages 127-152
63. Sharma Prempal, 'Ek Phaisle Ka Mahattva', *Samayantar*, Delhi, September, 2011.
64. Sharma, Mrinalini, 'Angreji Ka Varchasva', *Samayantar*, Delhi, July, 2011.

65. Shahi, Vinod, 'Bhasha Ki Gyan-Kuntha Urf Adhunikta Ka Dwadva', Distributed in a seminar on the theme of 'Bhoomandalikaran Aur Hindi Ki Asmita', Bharat Bhavan, Bhopal, September 24-25 (2011).
66. Thangirala, Maruti P., 'Language Choices and Life Chances: Evidence From the Civil Services Examination', *Economic and Political Weekly*, No. 39, September 26 (2009), pages 16-20.
67. Tiwari, Pramod Kumar, 'Janpadeeya Bhashayen: Hindi Se Antarsambandh Aur Antarsambandh Tatha Anchalikta Ki Adhunikta', Paper presented in a seminar on the theme of 'Bhoomandalikaran Aur Hindi Ki Asmita' at Bharat Bhavan, Bhopal, September 23-24, 2011.
68. Sheth, D.L., 'The Great Language Debate: Politics of Metropolitan versus Vernacular Elite', Sarangi, Asha (Edt.), *Language and Politics in India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2009, pages 267-298.
69. Kher, B.G., Report of the Official Language Commission, Government of India Press, New Delhi, 1956.
70. Singh, Uday Narain, *On Language Development and Planning: A Pluralistic Paradigm*, IIAS Shimla and Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1992.
71. Schwartzberg, Joseph E., 'Factors in the Linguistic Reorganisation of Indian States', Sarangi, Asha (Edt.), *Language and Politics in India*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2009, pages 139-182.
72. Sirohi, Balraj Singh, *Sangheeya Rajbhasha Ke Sandarbh Mein Paribhashik Vaigyanik Shabdavali Ki Samasyayen*, Vani Prakahan, Delhi, 1987.
73. Upadhyay, Veena, 'Rajbhasha Hindi: Sabal Sopanon Ki Or', *Hindustan*, Media Marketing Parishisht, September 14, 2011, Delhi.
74. Vajpai, Ashok, 'Hindi Ki Boliyan: Ek Batchect', Aginhotri, Ramakant and Sanjay Kumar (Edt.), *Bhasha, Boli Aur Samaj: Ek Antah-Samvad*, Deshkal Prakashan, Delhi, 2001, pages 116-120.
75. Windmiller, Marshal, 'Linguistic Regionalism in India', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 4, December (1954), pages 291-318.
76. Zaman, Mukhtar, *The Language Policy of India: The Problems of its Implementation and their Solution*, National Language Authority, Islamabad, 1984.

